

**LATINO CANDIDATES AND RACIAL BLOCK VOTING  
IN PRIMARY AND JUDICIAL ELECTIONS**

**An Analysis of Voting in  
Los Angeles County Board Districts**

**2008 Primary Election  
& L.A. County Superior Court Election  
[ June 3, 2008 ]**

**SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO  
THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY CHICANO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION**

**Report By:**

**Matt A. Barreto, Ph.D.  
Loren Collingwood, M.A.**

**October 2009**

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**ALL CITATIONS OF THIS REPORT MUST ACKNOWLEDGE:  
THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY CHICANO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION**

**RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS CONDUCTED BY:  
MATT A. BARRETO & LOREN COLLINGWOOD  
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**PLEASE CONTACT: 909.489.2955  
20008 8<sup>TH</sup> AVE NW  
SHORELINE, WA 98177  
[MBARRETO@UW.EDU](mailto:MBARRETO@UW.EDU)**

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**Official Title for Citation:**

Barreto, Matt A. and Loren Collingwood. 2009. "Latino Candidates and Racial Block Voting in Primary and Judicial Elections." Report Commissioned by: The Los Angeles County Chicano Employees Association. Alhambra, CA. [October 31.]

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## INTRODUCTION

We were retained by the Los Angeles County Chicano Employees Association (LACCEA) to examine whether or not evidence of racially polarized voting patterns existed in Los Angeles County that prevented Latino candidates from winning election outside of the 1<sup>st</sup> Supervisorial District, currently held by Latina Gloria Molina. In this particular study, we look at the 2008 Los Angeles County Primary election and the 2008 Superior Court Primary election and examine the support received by six different Latino candidates. In previous reports, we focused on Districts 3, 4 and 5 and examined a series of elections spanning the period 1994-2006. The focus of this inquiry is the issue of whether or not Latinos vote differently from non-Latinos in Los Angeles County Board of Supervisor Districts and whether or not Latinos are electable in LACCEA's alternatively configured District 3, primarily based on its September 2003 map (and also July 2002 version, see appendix).

In *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 US 30 (1986) the Supreme Court interpreted Section 2 of the recently amended Voting Rights Act (1965), making the existence of polarized voting one of three elements necessary to prove the dilution of minority voting. In *Gingles*, the now familiar definition of racially polarized voting was framed as occurring when there is a “consistent relationship between race of a voter and the way in which the voter votes.” Put simply, racially polarized voting occurs when minority and non-minority voters, considered separately, would have elected different candidates to office. A second element contained within the *Gingles* standard is, in a sense, implicit to this inquiry as well – whether or not the minority group in question constitutes a “politically cohesive unit.” If Latinos did not behave as a cohesive unit at the polls, evidence of racially polarized voting on the part of non-Latinos would be difficult to find.<sup>1</sup>

In this report, we examine a single election – the 2008 June primary – and demonstrate the degree of polarized voting in three of the Los Angeles County Supervisorial Districts. In so doing, we can also assess the extent to which Latinos may be considered a politically cohesive unit in the district. Our report is organized into

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<sup>1</sup> We took up the question of whether the Latino population was sufficient to create an additional district where Latinos as a group would have the ability to elect candidates of choice (the first *Gingles* “prong”) in an earlier report entitled “Anticipating Latino Voting Proclivity Under Proposed San Gabriel Valley District 3”. This earlier report also delves into some of the historical context and provides some relevant background to redistricting in Los Angeles County.

several sections, and follows much the same pattern as our earlier examinations of polarized voting. Following this introduction, we next review the data we used in conducting our analyses and making our determinations. Third, we detail our general approach and the methods we employ. Fourth, we present several summary tables of our results, using each methodological approach, across each election year and specific contest. We conclude briefly in summarizing what we think our results demonstrate concerning the degree to which voting may be characterized as racially polarized.

## THE AVAILABLE DATA

All the electoral data we use in the subsequent analysis is drawn from the Los Angeles County Registrar's Statement of the Vote for the June 3, 2008 Statewide Primary Election. We merged the relevant information for Latino Voting Age population from the US Census to each precinct. Unlike the data in our prior reports on this subject, the 2008 data are organized at the precinct level rather than RDU unit. Previously we used data provided by the County as part of their redistricting kit, which was organized at the RDU unit. In this case, we used aggregate precinct level data (cavass) purchased from the County Registrar Recorder and match the precinct election returns against voter registration data for Spanish surname registrants in each precinct in L.A. County.

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>Election</u>
Albert Robles	District Attorney	L.A. County Primary
MaryLou Cabral	Supervisor, 4 <sup>th</sup> District	L.A. County Supervisor
Serena Murillo	Justice, Position No. 69	Superior Court Judge
Patricia Nieto	Justice, Position No. 95	Superior Court Judge
John Gutierrez	Justice, Position No. 85	Superior Court Judge
Pablo Bruguera	Justice, Position No. 154	Superior Court Judge

## APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS

Because we do not have information concerning the vote choice of individual voters, we undertake an analytical approach that allows us to reliably estimate racially polarized voting using aggregate data. Individual level data could only be obtained were race/ethnicity indicators to be included on a person's ballot (in California it is not), or if survey data were readily available (in this case they are not). Without such information we employ a variety of statistical methods that make it possible for us to infer from aggregate level information how individuals within given political sub-units have voted, and how Latinos may have voted differently from non-Latinos.

We use a number of methods, categorized into four sections of summary results to examine the issue of racial polarization in the County. Each has been used in several previous cases<sup>2</sup>, and, as such have passed Court muster in a variety settings. These methods produce both statistical estimates of the level of support for the six different Latino candidates, and a graphical representation as well. We use this wide array of approaches to comport with the spirit contained within one expert's advice (Grofman 2000), which recommended "making use of the full range of available techniques" in an effort to guard as closely as possible against errors in interpretation. The first method (1) is simply the examination of a series of bivariate correlations between proportions of voter preference for the Latino candidate and the proportion of relevant Latino population within the same precinct. This is meant primarily to be an instructive device – as the presence of high, and statistically significant correlations suggests, but may not be in isolation, conclusive evidence of racially polarized voting. Nonetheless, consistently *positive* correlations between the proportion of Latino voters and vote preference for Latino candidates, resulting in by definition a *negative* correlations between the proportion of non-Latino voters and votes for the Latino candidates provides evidence of polarization.

In a second approach (2), we use a "homogenous precincts" style analysis and look specifically at precincts where the percentage of Latino registrants are at or above 70% of the precinct's total registered

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<sup>2</sup> These include, but are not limited to, *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 US 30 (1986), *Ruiiz v. City of Santa Maria*, 160 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 1998), *Gomez v. City of Watsonville* (9th Cir. 1988) 863 F.2d 1407.

population, or, in the case of or non-Latinos, 90%. Comparing the voting preferences of the most heavily Latino populated areas with the most heavily non-Latino populated areas gives some indication as to what the difference between the two groups of voters may be, and is a common first step in any analysis of this kind. By comparing these two types of precincts, we can limit the problems associated with inferring from aggregate level data, and in a straightforward manner determine polarized voting because nearly all the registered voters are of one group or the other. In general, results indicating that the two types of precincts are dramatically different from one another in the support they grant Latino candidates and issues provides further evidence of polarization in the County.

Our third approach (3) is a graphical presentation that plots the vote choice and percentage Latino population of each and every precinct within a given district. This allows the reader to easily determine whether or not differences exist between Latino and non-Latino precincts by comparing the left and right side of the scatter plot. Further, by mapping out the vote results for all precincts, we can judge the consistency or inconsistency of the Latino vote, and whether or not any “outlier” precincts exists. Consistent differences between Latinos and non-Latinos in the levels of support demonstrated here augment similar findings that emerge through the correlations and homogenous precinct analysis.

Our fourth approach (4) to the issue of polarized voting uses a variety of techniques made possible through King’s method of ecological inference, which offers another methodological approach to overcoming ecological data problems (see King 1997). In this, our last set of results (found in the Summary Results section below), we also provide estimates of polarization derived from Goodman’s ecological regression model so that the estimates derived from King’s MLE procedure might be readily compared with this more commonly utilized tool for determining polarization. If these two estimates are consistent with each other then any implications derived from them may be considered to be more substantial.

In addition to the summary tables presented below which contain the substantive results from each of the methods just described, we have also provided an appendix which includes the actual data underlying the estimates we report. We encourage the reader to review these various diagnostics in addition to the summaries

provided, as they may help to flesh out the relationships we see in the data. It is important to note from the outset that there is often no “silver bullet” in analyses of polarization. Here, we have endeavored to look at the issue in Los Angeles County’s Board of Supervisor Districts through as many available lenses as possible. For this reason, we have included a great deal of summary estimates of the degree to which polarized voting appears, as well as the full data for racially homogenous precincts found in the Appendix 1. If a consistent set of results shows up across the various methods employed here, then, in our view, the conclusions we derive become substantially more reliable than if we were to report the results of a single method in isolation.

## **SUMMARY OF RESULTS**

As we noted above, our first line of inquiry was focused on determining, through simple correlation analysis, whether or not the data for the three Status Quo districts indicated any degree of polarized voting between Latinos and non-Latinos.

### ***Bivariate Correlations between Ethnicity and Proportion in Support of Latino Candidates***

We correlate the proportion of the precinct that is Latino with the proportion supporting the Latino candidate. In general, the two may be positively correlated, negatively correlated, or be completely unrelated to one another. The larger the correlation coefficient becomes, the more robust the relationship between the variables in question (whether negative or positive). The values in parentheses found just below the correlation coefficient are p-values. Here, p-values of .000 indicate that the correlation between two variables cannot be due to chance – that is, the relationship between the two is real and statistically significant. Finally, while the correlations reported are for percent Latino and candidate preference, the relationship between percent non-Latino and candidate preference is simply the inverse of that reported in Table 1 if in fact the correlation is statistically significant.



<b>Table 1</b> <b>Correlation between Percent Latino and Vote for Latino Candidate</b> <b>Los Angeles County: by County Supervisor District</b>			
Candidate	District 3	District 4	District 5
Murillo	0.554 (.000)	0.341 (.000)	0.224 (.000)
Gutierrez	0.863 (.000)	0.721 (.000)	0.577 (.000)
Nieto	0.229 (.000)	0.471 (.000)	0.301 (.000)
Bruguera	0.719 (.000)	0.659 (.000)	0.597 (.000)
Robles	0.681 (.000)	0.679 (.000)	0.458 (.000)
Cabral	N/A	0.553 (.000)	N/A

Table 1 presents the results for all six Latino candidates in status quo Supervisor Districts 3, 4, and 5. In this table, the strength and statistical significance of the relationship between the Latino population in a precinct and preference for the Latino candidate becomes immediately apparent. The correlations are consistently strong and significant, showing that, as the proportion of a precinct becomes more Latino, support for Latino candidates increases. Stated differently, as a precinct becomes less Latino in population, the proportion of votes going to Latino candidates greatly diminishes. It should be stated that the correlations are robust for the 2008 election. A correlation of 1.0 would represent perfect collinearity where every single Latino voted for a Latino candidate while not a single non-Latino voted for the Latino candidate. Thus, the correlation coefficients reported in Table 1 in the range of .50, .70, to .80 suggest a very high degree of racially polarized voting. Even lesser correlations suggest that voting was polarized along racial lines, but that some cross-over voting did occur.

### ***Examining Homogenous Precincts***

This method is probably the simplest method for examining polarized voting. We use precincts within each district that are either 90% non-Latino (or greater) or 70% Latino (or greater) and compare the two against each other. Because of the smaller Latino population in District 5 there are very few districts that are 70% Latino or greater to conduct homogenous analysis, we examine precincts that are at least 50% Latino or greater.

Although we do report results for district 5, it is important to keep in mind that they are based on a smaller sample and lower threshold. For districts 3 and 4, there is a large enough sample and we have full confidence in the results. The ease with which this sort of comparison can be made, indeed without resorting to statistics of any kind, make this a logical precursor to more sophisticated methods of analysis. A downside to this sort of analysis is the availability of precincts that are sufficiently homogenous to be compared. Also, depending on the political jurisdiction in question, there may be some issue with assuming the voting patterns in more heterogeneous precincts will reflect what we see in the homogenous ones.

Our analysis takes two forms. The first, just below, are a series of t-tests that statistically measure the difference between the two types of precincts in the level of support granted for each of the six Latino candidates. A benefit to this sort of analysis is that we report the mean (or average) support within each type of homogenous precinct, the difference, and associated standard errors, which allow for a determination of whether the levels of support are statistically discernable from each other. The second is found in Appendix 1 and is actually a complete listing of each precinct, the proportion of the population that is either Latino or non-Latino, and the support for each candidate. Also found in this list is a name for the geographic area in which the precinct is located to facilitate understanding where exactly in each District these precincts are found.

**Table 2A**  
**T-Test Difference in Mean Support for Latino Candidates**  
**Homogenous Precincts, Los Angeles County Supervisor District 3**

Candidate	Prec. 90%		Prec. 70%		Difference
	Non-Latino	(S.E.)	Latino	(S.E.)	
Murillo	40.9%	0.003	62.6%	0.018	-21.6%
Gutierrez	7.7%	0.002	42.0%	.020	-34.3%
Nieto	58.0%	0.003	69.1%	.012	-11.1%
Bruguera	17.6%	0.003	45.3%	.019	-27.7%
Robles	15.9%	0.003	41.4%	.016	-25.4%

Table 2A summarizes the result for all five Latino candidates in District 3. These differences are fairly large and they are statistically discernable from one another as well (beyond six standard deviations). With the exception of Nieto, who had been selected as a Superior Court Commissioner in 2007, there is consistent evidence of racial block voting in District 3. Latino precincts voted overwhelmingly in favor of the candidates,

while non-Latino precincts voted against each Latino candidate (minus Nieto). Robles and Gutierrez who received about 40% of the Latino vote were in contests with three and four total candidates respectively and each was the preferred candidate among Latinos in District 3. The largest difference is for the Gutierrez candidacy for Superior Court, where he won 7.7 percent of the non-Latino vote compared to 42 percent of the Latino vote, a difference of 34 percentage points. In addition, for all six elections, the Latino candidates were ranked as the number one choice by Latinos, and three were never ranked either one or two by non-Latinos in District 3 (the exception being Nieto). Results for District 4 are presented in Table 2B and District 5 are presented in Table 2C. Both demonstrate a similar pattern of statistically significant racially-polarized voting between Latinos and non-Latinos in Los Angeles County, for both the L.A. County Primary and Superior Court elections. In both districts 4 and 5, even Nieto did not win over 50% of the non-Latino precincts, making the degree of racial block voting clear.

**Table 2B**  
**T-Test Difference in Mean Support for Latino Candidates**  
**Homogenous Precincts, Los Angeles County Supervisor District 4**

Candidate	Prec. 90%		Prec. 70%		Difference
	Non-Latino	(S.E.)	Latino	(S.E.)	
Murillo	49.3%	0.004	65.0%	0.019	-15.7%
Gutierrez	7.3%	0.002	41.6%	0.025	-34.3%
Nieto	45.8%	0.004	69.9%	0.029	-24.1%
Bruguera	15.5%	0.003	46.5%	0.025	-31.0%
Robles	13.1%	0.003	44.1%	0.024	-31.0%
Cabral	11.2%	0.003	25.6%	0.010	-14.4%

**Table 2C**  
**T-Test Difference in Mean Support for Latino Candidates**  
**Homogenous Precincts, Los Angeles County Supervisor District 5**

Candidate	Prec. 90%		Prec. 50%		Difference
	Non-Latino	(S.E.)	Latino	(S.E.)	
Murillo	47.2%	0.005	59.0%	0.029	-11.8%
Gutierrez	8.6%	0.004	30.3%	0.023	-21.7%
Nieto	45.1%	0.006	61.1%	0.031	-16.0%
Bruguera	15.6%	0.003	40.5%	0.025	-24.9%
Robles	12.7%	0.005	30.7%	0.035	-18.0%

### ***Graphical Presentation of the Data: Scatter plots***


Building on the homogenous precinct analysis reported above, we now detail the full range of votes that each candidate received, based on the Latino population within each precinct. We present these findings through a “map” of where each precinct lies on a simple X-Y scatter plot. The Y axis represents the percent of the vote going to the Latino candidate, while the X axis represents the percent of the voting-age population that is Latino within each precinct. This analysis offers a graphic presentation to the reader and allows us to assess two important characteristics of racial block voting. First, are there any outliers? That is, the means and coefficients reported here are akin to averages, and could hide precincts that do not conform to the overall observed behavior. Second, how similar to one another are the Latino (or non-Latino) precincts? Are they neatly arranged around similar point estimates close to one another, or are they “all over the map?”

The scatter plots clearly demonstrate that a strong and linear relationship exists between Latino population and votes in favor of the Latino candidates. This pattern is obvious all the Latino candidates. As the Latino population within a precinct increases – from left to right on the X axis – the percentage of the vote won by the Latino candidate grows. This trend is consistent for all six Latino candidates, across all three districts. Thus, in 12 separate analyses in different geographies across Los Angeles County, we find non-Latinos voting against a variety of Latino candidates, while Latinos uniformly vote in support of them.


Polarized voting is most clear in status quo District 3, although it is evident in the other two districts as well. In District 3, heavily Latino precincts are clustered near each other, showing strong support for the Latino candidates, with no instances of outliers (meaning no Latino precincts ever voted against the Latino candidates). This suggests that Latino voters do prefer descriptive representation, across a variety of different candidates and election types. Further, the non-Latino precincts also tend to cluster together in opposition to the Latino candidates (the only exception is Neito in District 3). The most notable examples of racial block voting are the Gutierrez and Robles elections, both of which demonstrate a clear linear relationship between race and vote choice in Los Angeles County.

Scatterplots: Vote for Latino candidate by percent Latino within precinct – District 3


**Figure 1A:**




**Figure 1B:**




**Figure 1C:**




**Figure 1D:**




**Figure 1E:**



**Figure 2A:**




**Figure 2B:**






**Figure 2C:**




(a) Nieto District 4

**Figure 2D:**




(b) Robles District 4


**Figure 2E:**



**Figure 2F:**




**Figure 3A:**




(a) Murillo District 5

**Figure 3B:**




(b) Gutierrez District 5

**Figure 3C:**




(a) Nieto District 5

**Figure 3D:**



(b) Robles District 5

**Figure 3E:**



### ***Kings' Ecological Inference & Goodman's Regression***

Gary King's 1997 book and the programming package that accompanies it are an effort to solve some of the more persistent problems associated with estimating individual level behavior from aggregate level information. The summary statistics produced by the program are included in the next sequence of tables, along with estimates of support based upon Leo Goodman's (1953) regression. In both cases, the columns headed with "Beta B" indicate the estimated proportion of Latino support for the Latino candidate in each district listed to the left hand side. "Beta W" on the other hand, is the estimate of non-Latino support. Both can be interpreted as percentage of the vote won. While both the King and Goodman techniques are estimated similarly, King's analysis software using a bounding method that prevents estimates from going above 100 or below 0 percent of the vote.

As should be immediately clear, in the 2008 Primary Election all sets of estimates are very similar. Under both the King and Goodman approaches, the election shows quite a bit of polarized voting. For all six contests, in each of the three districts, the Latino candidate was clearly the most preferred candidate among Latino voters and almost never the preferred candidate among non-Latinos.

**Table 3A: Ecological Inference and Ecological Regression  
Estimated Vote for Latino Candidates, Status Quo District 3**

Candidate	King		Goodman	
	Beta B	Beta W	Beta B	Beta W
Murillo	.701	.408	.685	.422
Gutierrez	.511	.078	.490	.067
Nieto	.689	.542	.655	.565
Bruguera	.517	.177	.505	.169
Robles	.448	.114	.437	.120

**Table 3B: Ecological Inference and Ecological Regression  
Estimated Vote for Latino Candidates, Status Quo District 4**

Candidate	King		Goodman	
	Beta B	Beta W	Beta B	Beta W
Murillo	.650	.477	.642	.482
Gutierrez	.481	.091	.473	.092
Nieto	.729	.453	.725	.465
Bruguera	.558	.168	.544	.174
Robles	.511	.133	.503	.136
Cabral	.301	.104	.283	.092

**Table 3C: Ecological Inference and Ecological Regression  
Estimated Vote for Latino Candidates, Status Quo District 3**

Candidate	King		Goodman	
	Beta B	Beta W	Beta B	Beta W
Murillo	.639	.469	.624	.474
Gutierrez	.408	.061	.393	.053
Nieto	.691	.407	.667	.414
Bruguera	.530	.099	.513	.106
Robles	.446	.098	.434	.106

The ecological inference and ecological regression analysis found in table 3 is perhaps the most rigorous, and also the most clear substantiation of racially polarized voting in Los Angeles County. Consistent with previous analysis from 1994 – 2006, we find significant and abundant evidence of racial block voting in 2008 across all three supervisor districts in question. The estimates reveal that Latino voters consistently favored the Latino candidates.

## ELECTABILITY OF LATINO CANDIDATES

The evidence presented above demonstrates a clear pattern of racially polarized voting in Status Quo Supervisor Districts 3, 4, and 5. Through four methods of analysis, the results show that Latino voters are attempting to elect Latino candidates, while non-Latino voters are systematically voting against such candidates. Racial block voting is only half of the story though. A successful case must also prove that Latino candidates are indeed electable in the alternative demonstration districts. Here, we provide a summary review of how each of the six Latino candidates fared in the five Status Quo districts as compared to the five LACCEA demonstration districts, dated September 2003. The percentages are derived by summing the total number of votes each candidate won in each precinct by Supervisor district. In particular, the reader should focus on the percent of the vote won by Latino candidates in the existing Supervisor Districts 3, 4, and 5 as compared to LACCEA's September 2003 demonstration District 3 – the second potential Latino district.

Table 4 reveals two important patterns. First, comparing the current Latino district in the Status Quo and LACCEA plan, Latino candidates are consistently favored throughout District 1. Murillo and Nieto would have won outright in both configurations, while Gutierrez finishes second in both, and would force a runoff. Only Robles falls off in the LACCEA district, allowing Cooley to surpass the 50% threshold in the primary. However, it is important to note that Cooley had been the incumbent District Attorney since 2000, and unseating an incumbent is a difficult task under any circumstances. In comparison Robles only won 19.6 percent of the vote countywide, so his showing in District 1 was considerably better. Thus, we conclude that Latino electability in the first district is not diminished under the LACCEA proposal.

The second important finding in Table 4 is that LACCEA District 3 proves a second Latino district can exist. Table 4 shows that as compared to Status Quo Districts 3, 4, and 5, all six Latino candidates won significantly more votes in LACCEA District 3. For example, Gutierrez, Murillo, and Robles all received at least 10 points more support in LACCEA District 3 than in the Status Quo. Gutierrez' support went from 12.8 percent finishing fourth in the Status Quo district 3, to 25.4 percent, finishing second and would have forced a runoff in the LACCEA district 3. Likewise Murillo would lose by more than 10 points under the current district



3, but would have won by 13 points under the LACCEA plan. Robles witnesses a considerable increase under the LACCEA plan, yet the incumbent Cooley still manages to garner over 50% - still a notable increase for Robles under the LACCEA district plan. The re-aggregated election results for the five countywide Latino candidates strongly demonstrate that they each did significantly better in LACCEA's alternative Board of Supervisor's District 3 as compared to their percentages in the current Supervisor Districts 3, 4 and 5. Latino candidates won outright in two contests, and were in second place in two elections, in the LACCEA District 3. Further, Latino candidates remain readily electable in the LACCEA alternative District 1, therefore providing two districts with a majority Latino population and the propensity to elect a Latino candidate to office.

**Table 4. Percent Vote Won by Latino Candidates in June 2008**  
**[ Sorted by L.A. County Supervisor Districts ]**

<b>Status Quo Supervisor District # 1</b>			<b>LACCEA Sept 2003 District # 1</b>		
<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>% Won</u>	<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>% Won</u>
Gutierrez	84	31.7%	Gutierrez	84	27.4%
Connolly	84	32.1%	Connolly	84	32.4%
Jones	84	23.6%	Jones	84	25.3%
Henry	84	12.4%	Henry	84	14.7%
Murillo	69	61.1%	Murillo	69	56.8%
Silberman	69	38.8%	Silberman	69	43.2%
Nieto	95	66.4%	Nieto	95	65.9%
Winters	95	33.5%	Winters	95	34.1%
Bruguera	154	39.8%	Bruguera	154	35.9%
Jesic	154	35.2%	Jesic	154	35.2%
Crabb	154	25.0%	Crabb	154	29.0%
Robles	DA	37.2%	Robles	DA	32.9%
Cooley	DA	48.4%	Cooley	DA	53.7%
Ipsen	DA	14.3%	Ipsen	DA	13.3%

<b>Status Quo Supervisor District # 2</b>			<b>LACCEA Sept 2003 District # 2</b>		
<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>% Won</u>	<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>% Won</u>
Gutierrez	84	16.8%	Gutierrez	84	16.6%
Connolly	84	27.9%	Connolly	84	29.8%
Jones	84	27.8%	Jones	84	27.2%
Henry	84	27.4%	Henry	84	26.4%
Murillo	69	40.7%	Murillo	69	41.9%
Silberman	69	59.2%	Silberman	69	58.1%
Nieto	95	67.2%	Nieto	95	65.2%
Winters	95	32.7%	Winters	95	34.8%
Bruguera	154	21.2%	Bruguera	154	21.1%
Jesic	154	30.5%	Jesic	154	31.8%
Crabb	154	48.2%	Crabb	154	47.1%
Robles	DA	19.2%	Robles	DA	19.5%
Cooley	DA	70.2%	Cooley	DA	69.0%
Ipsen	DA	10.5%	Ipsen	DA	11.5%

<b>Status Quo Supervisor District # 3</b>			<b>LACCEA Sept 2003 District # 3</b>		
<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>% Won</u>	<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>% Won</u>
Gutierrez	84	12.8%	Gutierrez	84	25.4%
Connolly	84	41.2%	Connolly	84	36.3%
Jones	84	31.8%	Jones	84	23.1%
Henry	84	14.1%	Henry	84	15.2%
Murillo	69	44.2%	Murillo	69	56.8%
Silberman	69	55.7%	Silberman	69	43.1%
Nieto	95	58.8%	Nieto	95	58.0%
Winters	95	41.2%	Winters	95	42.0%
Bruguera	154	20.7%	Bruguera	154	33.1%
Jesic	154	44.9%	Jesic	154	38.2%
Crabb	154	34.4%	Crabb	154	28.7%
Robles	DA	20.2%	Robles	DA	31.2%
Cooley	DA	62.8%	Cooley	DA	53.0%
Ipsen	DA	16.8%	Ipsen	DA	15.8%

Table 4 continued

**Table 4. Percent Vote Won by Latino Candidates in June 2008**  
**[ Sorted by L.A. County Supervisor Districts ]**

<b>Status Quo Supervisor District # 4</b>				<b>LACCEA Sept 2003 District # 4</b>		
<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>% Won</u>		<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>% Won</u>
Gutierrez	84	14.1%		Gutierrez	84	9.2%
Connolly	84	43.8%		Connolly	84	45.1%
Jones	84	25.2%		Jones	84	30.0%
Henry	84	16.9%		Henry	84	15.6%
Murillo	69	51.2%		Murillo	69	45.3%
Silberman	69	48.8%		Silberman	69	54.6%
Nieto	95	50.9%		Nieto	95	52.7%
Winters	95	49.1%		Winters	95	47.2%
Bruguera	154	20.4%		Bruguera	154	17.3%
Jesic	154	49.8%		Jesic	154	49.9%
Crabb	154	29.9%		Crabb	154	32.8%
Robles	DA	19.1%		Robles	DA	16.0%
Cooley	DA	64.2%		Cooley	DA	66.9%
Ipsen	DA	16.5%		Ipsen	DA	17.0%

<b>Status Quo Supervisor District # 5</b>				<b>LACCEA Sept 2003 District # 5</b>		
<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>% Won</u>		<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>% Won</u>
Gutierrez	84	12.3%		Gutierrez	84	13.6%
Connolly	84	44.9%		Connolly	84	44.1%
Jones	84	25.9%		Jones	84	26.4%
Henry	84	16.8%		Henry	84	15.9%
Murillo	69	49.4%		Murillo	69	48.8%
Silberman	69	50.5%		Silberman	69	51.2%
Nieto	95	47.7%		Nieto	95	50.1%
Winters	95	52.2%		Winters	95	49.9%
Bruguera	154	19.6%		Bruguera	154	20.3%
Jesic	154	49.3%		Jesic	154	48.0%
Crabb	154	31.1%		Crabb	154	31.8%
Robles	DA	16.8%		Robles	DA	18.1%
Cooley	DA	64.9%		Cooley	DA	63.7%
Ipsen	DA	18.2%		Ipsen	DA	18.2%

## CONCLUSIONS

We have offered several different approaches that each tell a remarkably similar story about the degree to which polarized voting exists in Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Districts. Recall that, paraphrasing Justice Brennan's opinion in *Gingles*, racially polarized voting can be identified as occurring when there is a consistent relationship between the race of a voter and the way in which she votes. In this case, there is a clear and consistent pattern; Latinos always preferred Latino candidates while non-Latinos did not. Under every different method we have employed here, this pattern remains robust and consistent. These results demonstrate that not only are Latinos politically cohesive in their support of Latino candidates in Los Angeles County, but also that non-Latinos vote consistently against Latino candidates in 2008. While our previous reports have demonstrated this pattern during the 1990s and early 2000s, the findings reported here clearly show that the pattern of racial block voting against Latino candidates continues to exist well into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Finally, the electability analysis clearly shows that a Latino candidate should be favored to win in LACCEA's Board of Supervisor District 3 if their alternative plan is adopted by the Federal courts.

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## Appendix A: Homogenous Precinct Listing and Vote by District

### Top 25 Most Heavily Latino Precincts in Status Quo District 3

	<u>Precinct</u>	<u>% Latino</u>	<u>% Gutierrez</u>	<u>% Murillo</u>	<u>% Nieto</u>	<u>% Robles</u>	<u>% Bruquera</u>
3	9000079A	88.4%	44.1%	58.3%	71.3%	36.3%	41.1%
3	6050016A	88.0%	54.7%	69.7%	64.6%	40.5%	57.4%
3	9000080A	87.9%	56.8%	76.1%	76.4%	59.1%	64.4%
3	9000328A	86.8%	41.6%	58.4%	72.5%	48.4%	39.1%
3	9000070A	86.0%	56.8%	68.9%	81.9%	53.0%	64.2%
3	6050002A	86.0%	57.7%	63.0%	69.1%	55.0%	58.0%
3	9000390A	85.8%	50.0%	70.0%	80.2%	49.5%	53.6%
3	9005666A	84.6%	46.0%	65.5%	72.4%	42.4%	42.6%
3	9000376A	80.7%	45.5%	60.8%	72.0%	47.5%	46.4%
3	9000327A	80.2%	40.3%	68.0%	70.9%	38.8%	37.5%
3	9000382A	78.6%	28.7%	62.9%	64.5%	41.3%	37.2%
3	6050013A	77.3%	40.8%	69.0%	67.7%	40.8%	50.0%
3	9000300A	75.9%	40.6%	76.2%	70.3%	50.7%	46.9%
3	9000301A	74.8%	38.2%	62.4%	60.8%	29.8%	36.3%
3	6050005A	74.8%	50.0%	68.8%	70.0%	36.9%	54.3%
3	9000396A	74.2%	45.5%	56.0%	63.9%	37.6%	43.3%
3	9003998A	73.6%	44.1%	69.6%	77.6%	45.4%	43.4%
3	6050009A	73.6%	42.3%	53.7%	64.3%	39.7%	45.5%
3	9000313A	73.1%	30.6%	37.5%	72.8%	38.5%	28.2%
3	9006214A	71.8%	29.0%	50.5%	68.9%	37.9%	33.3%
3	9000523A	71.4%	28.0%	47.0%	63.4%	28.7%	33.0%
3	9000384A	71.4%	45.9%	69.9%	69.1%	42.5%	52.1%
3	9000324A	70.5%	14.1%	52.2%	64.7%	26.0%	35.7%
3	9000467A	70.4%	44.2%	67.8%	60.9%	33.9%	45.2%
3	9002824A	70.0%	36.1%	63.2%	57.1%	34.2%	42.7%

### Top 25 Most Heavily Non-Latino Precincts in Status Quo District 3

	<u>Precinct</u>	<u>% Latino</u>	<u>% Gutierrez</u>	<u>% Murillo</u>	<u>% Nieto</u>	<u>% Robles</u>	<u>% Bruquera</u>
3	9001207A	0.0%	3.8%	48.6%	62.7%	12.2%	11.5%
3	9001354A	0.6%	5.0%	39.5%	68.6%	12.6%	10.8%
3	9007679A	0.8%	5.6%	50.3%	56.4%	9.8%	11.0%
3	9003431A	0.8%	8.1%	25.2%	51.7%	4.5%	20.1%
3	9002899A	0.9%	8.6%	26.1%	54.2%	10.9%	14.7%
3	9007985A	1.0%	5.7%	38.0%	54.1%	8.8%	11.3%
3	9001358A	1.0%	5.2%	43.5%	57.4%	10.2%	18.2%
3	9007674A	1.1%	8.8%	25.8%	50.9%	8.3%	7.2%
3	6250003D	1.1%	6.3%	52.3%	55.4%	14.4%	14.8%
3	0900013A	1.1%	4.7%	33.9%	59.2%	8.5%	11.8%
3	9001412A	1.1%	1.2%	29.0%	62.8%	12.5%	13.1%
3	9001361A	1.1%	4.9%	28.7%	55.6%	10.0%	9.5%
3	0070027A	1.1%	4.5%	36.8%	57.1%	9.5%	22.2%
3	0900004A	1.1%	4.3%	31.4%	54.2%	18.5%	18.9%
3	9001218A	1.1%	7.7%	39.2%	49.2%	2.4%	11.9%
3	6250008E	1.1%	8.2%	42.2%	57.7%	13.3%	23.6%
3	9001343A	1.2%	3.1%	40.7%	64.9%	10.2%	6.9%
3	9001356A	1.2%	3.2%	37.4%	54.8%	9.9%	10.8%
3	9001307A	1.2%	3.5%	40.4%	56.1%	7.8%	14.9%
3	9001408A	1.2%	11.0%	37.8%	59.2%	6.8%	18.4%
3	9001374A	1.2%	1.0%	49.7%	56.7%	10.3%	11.3%
3	9001199A	1.2%	7.3%	37.3%	63.8%	13.3%	18.7%
3	6250128B	1.3%	5.0%	51.2%	63.4%	12.6%	14.6%
3	6250128C	1.3%	15.4%	53.3%	53.8%	20.0%	0.0%
3	9001306A	1.4%	3.6%	39.6%	63.4%	9.7%	14.5%

## Appendix

### Top 25 Most Heavily Latino Precincts in Status Quo District 4

	<u>Precinct</u>	<u>% Latino</u>	<u>% Gutierrez</u>	<u>% Murillo</u>	<u>% Nieto</u>	<u>% Robles</u>	<u>% Bruguera</u>
4	9002633A	85.3%	52.2%	76.2%	81.4%	62.2%	59.0%
4	5100003B	83.0%	50.0%	69.7%	78.3%	41.2%	46.4%
4	9002636A	79.8%	54.7%	71.2%	83.6%	45.3%	57.7%
4	4800067A	78.6%	40.3%	67.7%	70.0%	46.8%	47.8%
4	9002618A	78.5%	41.9%	64.1%	73.2%	45.9%	45.8%
4	2650006A	77.2%	50.8%	66.1%	80.7%	47.8%	51.7%
4	3900061A	76.5%	50.0%	77.8%	81.1%	48.6%	57.5%
4	9008296A	75.5%	52.2%	71.2%	74.6%	48.6%	56.5%
4	4800053C	75.2%	40.8%	68.4%	69.5%	50.0%	55.7%
4	9003663A	74.0%	45.2%	67.6%	71.0%	61.1%	47.9%
4	2650004A	73.5%	24.2%	59.5%	45.5%	37.4%	27.7%
4	9000953B	72.8%	33.3%	58.0%	75.0%	40.0%	46.4%
4	7800148A	71.8%	23.1%	53.8%	57.4%	26.5%	28.1%
4	9002630A	70.7%	38.3%	56.1%	72.6%	28.6%	41.7%
4	7800176A	70.7%	30.4%	59.3%	55.4%	39.2%	35.2%
4	9002620A	70.3%	37.9%	53.2%	49.2%	35.9%	39.1%
4	5100011A	69.6%	42.0%	63.6%	69.0%	48.8%	44.0%
4	4800035A	69.4%	31.7%	66.1%	64.4%	38.1%	36.4%
4	9003742A	68.8%	53.2%	72.1%	65.9%	67.4%	52.2%
4	9002632B	68.5%	40.6%	61.8%	63.8%	43.2%	44.1%
4	1850012A	67.8%	31.9%	61.8%	71.1%	33.3%	43.2%
4	5100016A	67.1%	35.4%	62.7%	67.1%	23.3%	46.8%
4	3900073A	66.2%	43.1%	68.2%	66.7%	38.3%	52.7%
4	4800088A	65.7%	36.3%	63.0%	72.4%	37.5%	39.7%
4	0400001A	65.6%	49.3%	75.7%	70.8%	56.6%	50.7%

### Top 25 Most Heavily Non-Latino Precincts in Status Quo District 4

	<u>Precinct</u>	<u>% Latino</u>	<u>% Gutierrez</u>	<u>% Murillo</u>	<u>% Nieto</u>	<u>% Robles</u>	<u>% Bruguera</u>
4	5700001A	0.9%	8.3%	43.7%	35.4%	7.0%	11.6%
4	5050002A	1.0%	5.3%	50.5%	40.2%	5.7%	11.9%
4	5050013A	1.5%	5.7%	53.6%	37.6%	8.2%	11.9%
4	5530053A	1.6%	5.2%	48.2%	46.6%	10.6%	15.0%
4	5050006A	1.6%	5.1%	40.5%	38.7%	9.9%	15.5%
4	5050014A	1.8%	6.9%	54.5%	46.8%	5.0%	12.6%
4	4100004A	1.8%	8.0%	50.8%	40.7%	19.4%	15.9%
4	4100061A	1.8%	2.9%	55.8%	43.0%	15.4%	6.6%
4	4100018A	2.0%	2.8%	52.7%	31.9%	8.6%	10.9%
4	5530023A	2.0%	1.4%	48.4%	37.7%	5.7%	16.4%
4	5050008A	2.1%	2.9%	46.5%	38.4%	9.0%	12.9%
4	5050010A	2.2%	3.8%	52.9%	37.9%	8.1%	11.2%
4	4850005A	2.2%	3.2%	48.1%	33.6%	12.9%	8.7%
4	5530007A	2.3%	7.4%	48.0%	38.1%	5.7%	12.8%
4	4100013A	2.3%	4.5%	47.5%	38.2%	11.0%	9.6%
4	4100014A	2.4%	2.9%	45.9%	37.6%	6.8%	9.4%
4	9000040A	2.4%	8.0%	41.2%	48.3%	20.3%	15.5%
4	2750011A	2.4%	10.1%	45.8%	45.3%	16.5%	13.9%
4	5050004A	2.4%	7.7%	40.4%	47.9%	8.1%	18.3%
4	5700002A	2.5%	8.0%	46.2%	40.6%	8.3%	13.0%
4	2750001A	2.6%	6.4%	63.0%	46.2%	9.2%	11.6%
4	2750009A	2.6%	5.5%	53.8%	49.2%	13.3%	12.2%
4	5050001A	2.6%	7.4%	44.6%	36.1%	7.1%	14.6%
4	3850281A	2.6%	3.8%	42.5%	49.8%	5.3%	12.2%
4	5050003A	2.7%	9.1%	48.4%	39.1%	8.2%	18.7%

## Appendix

### Top 15 Most Heavily Latino Precincts in Status Quo District 5

	<u>Precinct</u>	<u>% Latino</u>	<u>% Gutierrez</u>	<u>% Murillo</u>	<u>% Nieto</u>	<u>% Robles</u>	<u>% Bruguera</u>
5	5500035F	71.4%	50.0%	33.3%	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%
5	9005662A	69.9%	41.2%	64.3%	83.2%	34.3%	47.3%
5	1940001A	67.9%	28.8%	67.3%	71.4%	50.9%	56.9%
5	1900001A	63.5%	31.5%	64.1%	79.6%	44.4%	38.5%
5	5500100A	61.2%	27.4%	50.0%	46.7%	32.0%	37.0%
5	1940008A	56.2%	32.9%	78.3%	70.3%	44.8%	50.7%
5	1100072A	53.0%	30.4%	54.0%	54.9%	28.4%	33.7%
5	7700003A	52.9%	24.3%	56.9%	54.0%	25.0%	34.8%
5	7700001A	52.8%	23.2%	50.4%	46.1%	24.2%	24.3%
5	6100018A	52.7%	40.3%	68.8%	72.9%	51.9%	47.8%
5	7700145B	52.6%	19.4%	53.9%	56.1%	23.2%	36.8%
5	5500011A	52.3%	22.1%	49.2%	50.8%	24.6%	33.3%
5	9005663A	52.0%	25.8%	54.9%	64.0%	22.9%	37.9%
5	0150033A	51.0%	39.5%	67.1%	66.7%	35.2%	51.3%
5	1100073A	50.2%	18.4%	72.5%	50.0%	17.9%	27.1%

### Top 25 Most Heavily Non-Latino Precincts in Status Quo District 5

	<u>Precinct</u>	<u>% Latino</u>	<u>% Gutierrez</u>	<u>% Murillo</u>	<u>% Nieto</u>	<u>% Robles</u>	<u>% Bruguera</u>
5	4700005A	0.0%	0.0%	44.4%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%
5	5000043A	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%
5	5500119A	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
5	5900001A	0.0%	10.7%	48.3%	40.0%	7.8%	12.9%
5	1750029A	1.1%	12.8%	52.6%	33.3%	13.5%	10.5%
5	3150001A	1.7%	8.9%	49.8%	40.8%	6.4%	13.4%
5	3150018A	1.9%	4.1%	53.4%	44.9%	5.7%	16.7%
5	3150032A	2.0%	4.6%	41.0%	46.8%	8.2%	16.2%
5	3150023A	2.1%	9.8%	38.7%	48.6%	9.0%	18.5%
5	3150037B	2.5%	4.9%	39.3%	48.3%	15.5%	16.3%
5	3150037A	2.5%	10.4%	39.6%	49.3%	11.7%	19.9%
5	3150025A	2.5%	3.8%	43.1%	41.3%	7.1%	11.3%
5	3200004A	2.7%	6.8%	51.3%	48.0%	10.8%	11.4%
5	3200003A	2.8%	9.0%	47.4%	44.9%	10.7%	10.8%
5	6200006A	2.8%	7.8%	61.0%	39.2%	5.1%	10.9%
5	3150021A	2.9%	4.3%	38.8%	41.3%	5.9%	13.6%
5	0350036A	2.9%	6.7%	45.0%	41.8%	12.7%	9.8%
5	6200011A	2.9%	8.2%	51.7%	34.3%	4.6%	18.1%
5	6200005A	3.0%	9.4%	71.1%	34.3%	7.8%	11.0%
5	3750047A	3.1%	0.0%	80.0%	35.7%	5.3%	25.0%
5	6200018A	3.1%	5.3%	52.4%	48.2%	14.9%	16.3%
5	3150040A	3.1%	4.9%	47.1%	40.5%	7.9%	10.8%
5	3150016A	3.2%	5.9%	50.8%	47.7%	9.7%	16.7%
5	2550001A	3.3%	6.7%	51.3%	51.6%	10.8%	14.9%
5	6220025A	3.5%	8.3%	40.7%	38.0%	9.9%	12.5%



APPENDIX II: ALTERNATE LACCEA DISTRICTS – JULY 2002

**APPENDIX: Percent Vote Won by Latino Candidates in June 2008**  
**[ Sorted by L.A. County Supervisor Districts ]**

Status Quo Supervisor District # 1			LACCEA July 2002 District # 1		
Candidate	Office	% Won	Candidate	Office	% Won
Gutierrez	84	31.7%	Gutierrez	84	26.1%
Connolly	84	32.1%	Connolly	84	33.4%
Jones	84	23.6%	Jones	84	25.9%
Henry	84	12.4%	Henry	84	14.1%
Murillo	69	61.1%	Murillo	69	57.6%
Silberman	69	38.8%	Silberman	69	42.4%
Nieto	95	66.4%	Nieto	95	63.7%
Winters	95	33.5%	Winters	95	36.3%
Bruguera	154	39.8%	Bruguera	154	34.2%
Jesic	154	35.2%	Jesic	154	35.9%
Crabb	154	25.0%	Crabb	154	29.9%
Robles	DA	37.2%	Robles	DA	30.5%
Cooley	DA	48.4%	Cooley	DA	55.8%
Ipsen	DA	14.3%	Ipsen	DA	14.7%

Status Quo Supervisor District # 2			LACCEA July 2002 District # 2		
Candidate	Office	% Won	Candidate	Office	% Won
Gutierrez	84	16.8%	Gutierrez	84	15.9%
Connolly	84	27.9%	Connolly	84	28.7%
Jones	84	27.8%	Jones	84	28.4%
Henry	84	27.4%	Henry	84	25.8%
Murillo	69	40.7%	Murillo	69	41.5%
Silberman	69	59.2%	Silberman	69	58.5%
Nieto	95	67.2%	Nieto	95	66.5%
Winters	95	32.7%	Winters	95	33.5%
Bruguera	154	21.2%	Bruguera	154	20.3%
Jesic	154	30.5%	Jesic	154	32.3%
Crabb	154	48.2%	Crabb	154	47.4%
Robles	DA	19.2%	Robles	DA	19.3%
Cooley	DA	70.2%	Cooley	DA	69.1%
Ipsen	DA	10.5%	Ipsen	DA	11.6%

Status Quo Supervisor District # 3			LACCEA July 2002 District # 3		
Candidate	Office	% Won	Candidate	Office	% Won
Gutierrez	84	12.8%	Gutierrez	84	23.7%
Connolly	84	41.2%	Connolly	84	37.6%
Jones	84	31.8%	Jones	84	25.4%
Henry	84	14.1%	Henry	84	14.3%
Murillo	69	44.2%	Murillo	69	54.2%
Silberman	69	55.7%	Silberman	69	45.8%
Nieto	95	58.8%	Nieto	95	58.0%
Winters	95	41.2%	Winters	95	42.0%
Bruguera	154	20.7%	Bruguera	154	31.3%
Jesic	154	44.9%	Jesic	154	39.4%
Crabb	154	34.4%	Crabb	154	29.3%
Robles	DA	20.2%	Robles	DA	29.5%
Cooley	DA	62.8%	Cooley	DA	54.1%
Ipsen	DA	16.8%	Ipsen	DA	16.4%

APPENDIX II: CONTINUED

**APPENDIX: Percent Vote Won by Latino Candidates in June 2008**

**[ Sorted by L.A. County Supervisor Districts ]**

<b>Status Quo Supervisor District # 4</b>				<b>LACCEA July 2002 District # 4</b>		
<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>% Won</u>		<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>% Won</u>
Gutierrez	84	14.1%		Gutierrez	84	9.2%
Connolly	84	43.8%		Connolly	84	45.1%
Jones	84	25.2%		Jones	84	30.0%
Henry	84	16.9%		Henry	84	15.6%
Murillo	69	51.2%		Murillo	69	45.3%
Silberman	69	48.8%		Silberman	69	54.6%
Nieto	95	50.9%		Nieto	95	52.7%
Winters	95	49.1%		Winters	95	47.2%
Bruguera	154	20.4%		Bruguera	154	17.3%
Jesic	154	49.8%		Jesic	154	49.9%
Crabb	154	29.9%		Crabb	154	32.8%
Robles	DA	19.1%		Robles	DA	16.0%
Cooley	DA	64.2%		Cooley	DA	66.9%
Ipsen	DA	16.5%		Ipsen	DA	17.0%

<b>Status Quo Supervisor District # 5</b>				<b>LACCEA July 2002 District # 5</b>		
<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>% Won</u>		<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>% Won</u>
Gutierrez	84	12.3%		Gutierrez	84	13.6%
Connolly	84	44.9%		Connolly	84	44.1%
Jones	84	25.9%		Jones	84	26.4%
Henry	84	16.8%		Henry	84	15.9%
Murillo	69	49.4%		Murillo	69	48.8%
Silberman	69	50.5%		Silberman	69	51.2%
Nieto	95	47.7%		Nieto	95	50.1%
Winters	95	52.2%		Winters	95	49.9%
Bruguera	154	19.6%		Bruguera	154	20.3%
Jesic	154	49.3%		Jesic	154	48.0%
Crabb	154	31.1%		Crabb	154	31.8%
Robles	DA	16.8%		Robles	DA	18.1%
Cooley	DA	64.9%		Cooley	DA	63.7%
Ipsen	DA	18.2%		Ipsen	DA	18.2%