LATINO CANDIDATES AND RACIAL BLOCK VOTING IN 2010 PRIMARY AND JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

An Analysis of Voting in Los Angeles County Board Districts

2010 Primary Election & L.A. County Superior Court Election [June 8, 2010]

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO
THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY CHICANO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

Report By:

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ALL CITATIONS OF THIS REPORT MUST ACKNOWLEDGE: THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY CHICANO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

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INTRODUCTION

We were retained by the Los Angeles County Chicano Employees Association (LACCEA) to examine whether or not evidence of racially polarized voting patterns existed in Los Angeles County that prevented Latino candidates from winning election outside of the 1st Supervisorial District, currently held by Latina Gloria Molina. In this particular study, we look at the 2010 Los Angeles County Primary election and the 2010 Superior Court Primary election and examine the support received by 16 different Latino candidates, across seven different contests. In previous reports, we focused on Districts 3, 4 and 5 and examined a series of elections spanning the period 1994-2009. The focus of this inquiry is the issue of whether or not Latinos vote differently from non-Latinos in Los Angeles County Board of Supervisor Districts and whether or not Latinos are electable in LACCEA's alternatively configured District 3, primarily based on its September 2003 map (and also July 2002 version, see appendix).

In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 US 30 (1986) the Supreme Court interpreted Section 2 of the recently amended Voting Rights Act (1965), making the existence of polarized voting one of three elements necessary to prove the dilution of minority voting. In Gingles, the now familiar definition of racially polarized voting was framed as occurring when there is a "consistent relationship between race of a voter and the way in which the voter votes." Put simply, racially polarized voting occurs when minority and non-minority voters, considered separately, would have elected different candidates to office. A second element contained within the Gingles standard is, in a sense, implicit to this inquiry as well – whether or not the minority group in question constitutes a "politically cohesive unit." If Latinos did not behave as a cohesive unit at the polls, evidence of racially polarized voting on the part of non-Latinos would be difficult to find.¹

In this report, we examine a single election – the 2010 June primary – and demonstrate the degree of polarized voting in three of the Los Angeles County Supervisorial Districts. In so doing, we can also assess the

¹ We took up the question of whether the Latino population was sufficient to create an additional district where Latinos as a group would have the ability to elect candidates of choice (the first Gingles "prong") in an earlier report entitled "Anticipating Latino Voting Proclivity Under Proposed San Gabriel Valley District 3". This earlier report also delves into some of the historical context and provides some relevant background to redistricting in Los Angeles County.

extent to which Latinos may be considered a politically cohesive unit in the district. Our report is organized into several sections, and follows much the same pattern as out earlier examinations of polarized voting. Following this introduction, we next review the data we used in conducting our analyses and making our determinations. Third, we detail our general approach and the methods we employ. Fourth, we present several summary tables of our results, using each methodological approach, across each election year and specific contest. We conclude briefly in summarizing what we think our results demonstrate concerning the degree to which voting may be characterized as racially polarized.

THE AVAILABLE DATA

All the electoral data we use in the subsequent analysis is drawn from the Los Angeles County Registrar's Statement of the Vote for the June 2010 Statewide Primary Election. We merged the relevant information for Latino Voting Age population from the US Census to each precinct. Unlike the data in our prior reports on this subject, the 2010 data are organized at the precinct level rather than RDU unit. Previously we used data provided by the County as part of their redistricting kit, which was organized at the RDU unit. In this case, we used aggregate precinct level data (canvass) purchased from the County Registrar Recorder and match the precinct election returns against voter registration data for Spanish surname registrants in each precinct in L.A. County.

<u>Candidate</u>	Office	Election
Nava	Attorney General	State Democratic Primary
Torrico	Attorney General	State Democratic Primary
Delgadillo	Attorney General	State Democratic Primary
De la Torre	Insurance Commissioner	State Democratic Primary
Garcia	Justice, Position No. 28	Superior Court Judge
Moreno	Justice, Position No. 28	Superior Court Judge
De los Reyes	Justice, Position No. 107	Superior Court Judge
Griego	Justice, Position No. 117	Superior Court Judge
Aceves	Superintendent Public Inst.	L.A. County Primary
Gutierrez	Superintendent Public Inst.	L.A. County Primary
Romero	Superintendent Public Inst.	L.A. County Primary
Chavez	County Assessor	L.A. County Primary
Cornejo	County Assessor	L.A. County Primary
Gomez	County Assessor	L.A. County Primary
Salazar	County Assessor	L.A. County Primary
Noguez	County Assessor	L.A. County Primary

APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS

Because we do not have information concerning the vote choice of individual voters, we undertake an analytical approach that allows us to reliably estimate racially polarized voting using aggregate data. Individual level data could only be obtained were race/ethnicity indicators to be included on a person's ballot (in California it is not), or if survey data were readily available (in this case they are not). Without such information we employ a variety of statistical methods that make it possible for us to infer from aggregate level information how individuals within given political sub-units have voted, and how Latinos may have voted differently from non-Latinos.

We use a number of methods, categorized into four sections of summary results to examine the issue of racial polarization in the County. Each has been used in several previous cases², and, as such have passed Court muster in a variety settings. These methods produce both statistical estimates of the level of support for the 16 different Latino candidates, and a graphical representation as well. We use this wide array of approaches to comport with the spirit contained within one expert's advice (Grofman 2000), which recommended "making use of the full range of available techniques" in an effort to guard as closely as possible against errors in interpretation. The first method (1) is simply the examination of a series of bivariate correlations between proportions of voter preference for the Latino candidate and the proportion of relevant Latino population within the same precinct. This is meant primarily to be an instructive device – as the presence of high, and statistically significant correlations suggests, but may not be in isolation, conclusive evidence of racially polarized voting. Nonetheless, consistently *positive* correlations between the proportion of Latino voters and vote preference for Latino candidates, resulting in by definition a *negative* correlations between the proportion of non-Latino voters and votes for the Latino candidates provides evidence of polarization.

In a second approach (2), we use a "homogenous precincts" style analysis and look specifically at precincts where the percentage of Latino registrants are at or above 70% of the precinct's total registered

² These include, but are not limited to, *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 US 30 (1986), *Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria*, 160 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 1998), *Gomez v. City of Watsonville* (9th Cir. 1988) 863 F.2d 1407.

population, or, in the case of or non-Latinos, 90%. Comparing the voting preferences of the most heavily Latino populated areas with the most heavily non-Latino populated areas gives some indication as to what the difference between the two groups of voters may be, and is a common first step in any analysis of this kind. By comparing these two types of precincts, we can limit the problems associated with inferring from aggregate level data, and in a straightforward manner determine polarized voting because nearly all the registered voters are of one group or the other. In general, results indicating that the two types of precincts are dramatically different from one another in the support they grant Latino candidates and issues provides further evidence of polarization in the County.

Our third approach (3) is a graphical presentation that plots the vote choice and percentage Latino population of each and every precinct within a given district. This allows the reader to easily determine whether or not differences exist between Latino and non-Latino precincts by comparing the left and right side of the scatter plot. Further, by mapping out the vote results for all precincts, we can judge the consistency or inconsistency of the Latino vote, and whether or not any "outlier" precincts exists. Consistent differences between Latinos and non-Latinos in the levels of support demonstrated here augment similar findings that emerge through the correlations and homogenous precinct analysis.

Our fourth approach (4) to the issue of polarized voting uses a variety of techniques made possible through King's method of ecological inference, which offers another methodological approach to overcoming ecological data problems (see King 1997). In this, our last set of results (found in the Summary Results section below), we also provide estimates of polarization derived from Goodman's ecological regression model so that the estimates derived from King's MLE procedure might be readily compared with this more commonly utilized tool for determining polarization. If these two estimates are consistent with each other then any implications derived from them may be considered to be more substantial.

In addition to the summary tables presented below which contain the substantive results from each of the methods just described, we have also provided an appendix which includes the actual data underlying the estimates we report. We encourage the reader to review these various diagnostics in addition to the summaries provided, as they may help to flesh out the relationships we see in the data. It is important to note from the outset that there is often no "silver bullet" in analyses of polarization. Here, we have endeavored to look at the issue in Los Angeles County's Board of Supervisor Districts through as many available lenses as possible. For this reason, we have a included a great deal of summary estimates of the degree to which polarized voting appears, as well as the full data for racially homogenous precincts found in the Appendix 1. If a consistent set of results shows up across the various methods employed here, then, in our view, the conclusions we derive become substantially more reliable than if we were to report the results of a single method in isolation.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

As we noted above, our first line of inquiry was focused on determining, through simple correlation analysis, whether or not the data for the three Status Quo districts indicated any degree of polarized voting between Latinos and non-Latinos.

Bivariate Correlations between Ethnicity and Proportion in Support of Latino Candidates

We correlate the proportion of the precinct that is Latino with the proportion supporting the Latino candidate. In general, the two may be positively correlated, negatively correlated, or be completely unrelated to one another. The larger the correlation coefficient becomes, the more robust the relationship between the variables in question (whether negative or positive). The values in parentheses found just below the correlation coefficient are p-values. Here, p-values of .000 indicate that the correlation between two variables cannot be due to chance – that is, the relationship between the two is real and statistically significant. Finally, while the correlations reported are for percent Latino and candidate preference, the relationship between percent non-Latino and candidate preference is simply the inverse of that reported in Table 1 if in fact the correlation is statistically significant.

Table 1
Correlation between Percent Latino and Vote for Latino Candidate
Los Angeles County: by County Supervisor District

	<u> </u>		
Candidate	District 3	District 4	District 5
Norre	0.344	0.469	0.365
Nava	(000)	(000)	(000)
Т	0.331	0.445	0.261
Torrico	(000)	(.000)	(000)
D 1 1'11	0.836	0.642	0.484
Delgadillo	(000)	(.000)	(000)
ACI (1	0.859	0.742	0.629
AG Latino total	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
D 1 ///	0.721	0.680	0.597
De la Torre	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
	0.801	0.607	0.540
Garcia	(.000)	(.000.)	(.000)
	0.295	0.487	0.313
Moreno	(.000)	(.000.)	(.000)
	0.789	0.706	0.597
J28 Latino total	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
De los Reyes	0.707	0.524	0.338
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Griego Aceves	0.523	0.1911	0.278
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
	-0.572	-0.505	-0.587
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
	0.663	0.550	0.481
Gutierrez			
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Romero	0.668	0.628	0.459
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
SPI Latino total	0.480	0.362	0.153
	(.000)	(.000.)	(.000)
Chavez	0.706	0.732	0.707
g	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Cornejo	0.671	0.561	0.409
	(.000.)	(.000.)	(.000)
Gomez	0.676	0.194	0.392
Come	(000.)	(000.)	(.000)
Salazar	0.586	0.495	0.474
Salazar	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Noguez	0.015	-0.255	-0.247
TNOGUCZ	(.755)	(.000)	(.000)
ASR Latino total	0.842	0.647	0.658
ASIX Laulio totai	(000)	(.000)	(000)

Table 1 presents the results for all 16 Latino candidates in status quo Supervisor Districts 3, 4, and 5. In this table, the strength and statistical significance of the relationship between the Latino population in a precinct and preference for the Latino candidate becomes immediately apparent. The correlations are consistently strong and significant, showing that, as the proportion of a precinct becomes more Latino, support for Latino candidates increases. Stated differently, as a precinct becomes less Latino in population, the proportion of votes going to Latino candidates greatly diminishes. It should be stated that the correlations are robust for the 2010 election. A correlation of 1.0 would represent perfect collinearity where every single Latino voted for a Latino candidate while not a single non-Latino voted for the Latino candidate. Thus, the correlation coefficients reported in Table 1 in the range of .50, .70, to .80 suggest a very high degree of racially polarized voting. Even lesser correlations suggest that voting was polarized along racial lines, but that some cross-over voting did occur.

Examining Homogenous Precincts

This method is probably the simplest method for examining polarized voting. We use precincts within each district that are either 90% non-Latino (or greater) or 70% Latino (or greater) and compare the two against each other. Because of the smaller Latino population in District 5 there are very few districts that are 70% Latino or greater to conduct homogenous analysis, we examine precincts that are at least 50% Latino or greater. Although we do report results for district 5, it is important to keep in mind that they are based on a smaller sample and lower threshold. For districts 3 and 4, there is a large enough sample and we have full confidence in the results. The ease with which this sort of comparison can be made, indeed without resorting to statistics of any kind, make this a logical precursor to more sophisticated methods of analysis. A downside to this sort of analysis is the availability of precincts that are sufficiently homogenous to be compared. Also, depending on the political jurisdiction in question, there may be some issue with assuming the voting patterns in more heterogeneous precincts will reflect what we see in the homogenous ones.

Our analysis takes two forms. The first, just below, are a series of t-tests that statistically measure the difference between the two types of precincts in the level of support granted for each of the 16 Latino candidates. A benefit to this sort of analysis is that we report the mean (or average) support within each type of

homogenous precinct, the difference, and associated standard errors, which allow for a determination of whether the levels of support are statistically discernable from each other. The second is found in Appendix 1 and is actually a complete listing of each precinct, the proportion of the population that is either Latino or non-Latino, and the support for each candidate. Also found in this list is a name for the geographic area in which the precinct is located to facilitate understanding where exactly in each District these precincts are found.

Table 2A
T-Test Difference in Mean Support for Latino Candidates
Homogenous Precincts, Los Angeles County Supervisor District 3

	Prec. 90%		Prec. 70%		
Candidate	Non-Latino	(S.D.)	Latino	(S.D.)	Difference
Nava	7.2%	0.032	13.5%	0.047	-6.3%
Torrico	8.4%	0.036	12.5%	0.045	-4.1%
Delgadillo	12.4%	0.038	34.6%	0.098	-22.2%
AG Latino total	28.0%	0.056	60.6%	0.131	-32.6%
De la Torre	23.3%	0.061	47.2%	0.128	-23.9%
Garcia	10.6%	0.044	34.2%	0.106	-23.6%
Moreno	17.2%	0.058	27.2%	0.081	-10.0%
J28 Latino total	27.8%	0.067	61.4%	0.151	-33.6%
De los Reyes	18.8%	0.042	40.6%	0.058	-21.8%
Griego	25.7%	0.050	38.9%	0.067	-13.2%
Aceves	23.3%	0.061	13.6%	0.055	+9.7%
Gutierrez	5.3%	0.027	15.4%	0.041	-10.1%
Romero	17.8%	0.051	38.4%	0.105	-20.6%
SPI Latino total	46.5%	0.071	67.4%	0.019	-20.9%
Chavez	1.9%	0.013	10.3%	0.032	-8.4%
Cornejo	1.2%	0.010	6.8%	0.043	-5.6%
Gomez	1.8%	0.004	11.6%	0.037	-9.8%
Salazar	6.4%	0.025	14.9%	0.031	-8.5%
Noguez	17.7%	0.037	18.1%	0.044	-0.4%
ASR Latino total	29.3%	0.048	61.7%	0.078	-32.4%

Table 2A summarizes the result for all five Latino candidates in District 3. These differences are fairly large and they are statistically discernable from one another as well (beyond six standard deviations). With the exception of Aceves, who was seen as the establishment candidate in the race for superintendent of public instruction, there is consistent evidence of racial block voting in District 3. Latino precincts voted overwhelmingly in favor of the candidates, while non-Latino precincts voted against each Latino candidate (minus Aceves). For example, Delgadillo won just 12.4% of the vote in non-Latino precincts, compared to

34.6% in heavily Latino precincts in a race with multiple candidates, and combined the three Latino candidates for Attorney General won 60.6% of the vote in heavily Latino precincts compared to just 28% in non-Latino precincts.. The largest difference is for the Garcia candidacy for Superior Court, where he won 10.6 percent of the non-Latino vote compared to 34.2 percent of the Latino vote, a difference of about 24 percentage points. In addition, for all seven elections, the Latino candidates were ranked as the number one choice by Latinos, and were never ranked either one or two by non-Latinos in District 3 (the exception being Aceves). Results for District 4 are presented in Table 2B and District 5 are presented in Table 2C. Both demonstrate a similar pattern of statistically significant racially-polarized voting between Latinos and non-Latinos in Los Angeles County, for both the L.A. County Primary and Superior Court elections. In both districts 4 and 5, heavily Latino precincts voted consistently strong for Latino candidates, in direct contrast to non-Latino precincts where Spanish surname candidates did far, far worse, making the degree of racial block voting clear.

Table 2B
T-Test Difference in Mean Support for Latino Candidates
Homogenous Precincts, Los Angeles County Supervisor District 4

Tiomogenou	is Frecincis, Los	Migcies	county super	V1501 D15	11101 7
	Prec. 90%		Prec. 70%		
Candidate	Non-Latino	(S.D.)	Latino	(S.D.)	Difference
Nava	5.7%	0.028	19.1%	0.039	-13.4%
Torrico	7.6%	0.045	15.4%	0.025	-7.8%
Delgadillo	10.6%	0.049	29.2%	0.051	-18.6%
AG Latino total	23.9%	0.091	63.8%	0.041	-39.9%
De la Torre	25.1%	0.073	52.5%	0.073	-27.4%
Garcia	14.4%	0.042	37.9%	0.072	-23.5%
Moreno	13.1%	0.041	27.4%	0.079	-14.3%
J28 Latino total	27.5%	0.048	65.4%	0.083	-37.9%
De los Reyes	16.6%	0.043	45.2%	0.078	-28.6%
Griego	27.7%	0.053	35.7%	0.050	-8.0%
Aceves	28.8%	0.061	11.7%	0.118	+17.1%
Gutierrez	8.6%	0.031	20.4%	0.035	-10.1%
Romero	13.0%	0.034	41.7%	0.073	-20.6%
SPI Latino total	50.4%	0.057	73.8%	0.056	-20.9%
Chavez	1.6%	0.034	12.5%	0.000	-10.9%
Cornejo	1.4%	0.048	8.9%	0.000	-7.5%
Gomez	1.2%	0.021	13.1%	0.000	-11.9%
Salazar	5.6%	0.004	15.6%	0.000	-10.0%
Noguez	17.3%	0.041	18.2%	0.000	-0.9%
ASR Latino total	27.1%	0.055	68.3%	0.000	-41.2%

Table 2C
T-Test Difference in Mean Support for Latino Candidates 2010
Homogenous Precincts, Los Angeles County Supervisor District 5

	Prec. 90%	, rangeres	Prec. 70%	. , 1001 2 10	
Candidate	Non-Latino	(S.D.)	Latino	(S.D.)	Difference
Nava	6.3%	0.034	8.4%	0.072	-2.1%
Torrico	10.2%	0.045	10.5%	0.082	-0.3%
Delgadillo	13.4%	0.049	15.6%	0.123	-2.2%
AG Latino total	29.9%	0.062	34.4%	0.247	-4.5%
De la Torre	25.1%	0.069	36.4%	0.165	-11.3%
Garcia	12.7%	0.050	16.8%	0.128	-4.1%
Moreno	12.4%	0.052	18.6%	0.154	-6.2%
J28 Latino total	25.1%	0.066	34.4%	0.210	-9.3%
De los Reyes	14.7%	0.049	28.3%	0.109	-13.6%
Griego	29.2%	0.057	32.2%	0.269	-3.0%
Aceves	26.0%	0.060	25.2%	0.294	-0.8%
Gutierrez	6.9%	0.035	11.1%	0.072	-4.2%
Romero	14.7%	0.057	23.0%	0.190	-8.3%
SPI Latino total	47.6%	0.083	59.3%	0.169	-11.7%
Chavez	1.2%	0.043	9.8%	0.111	-00.0%
Cornejo	1.6%	0.051	9.4%	0.098	-00.0%
Gomez	0.9%	0.054	11.3%	0.145	-00.0%
Salazar	6.1%	0.032	16.7%	0.097	-00.0%
Noguez	20.9%	0.089	22.3%	0.158	-00.0%
ASR Latino total	30.7%	0.078	69.5%	0.175	-00.0%

Graphical Presentation of the Data: Scatter plots

Building on the homogenous precinct analysis reported above, we now detail the full range of votes that each candidate received, based on the Latino population within each precinct. We present these findings through a "map" of where each precinct lies on a simple X-Y scatter plot. The Y axis represents the percent of the vote going to the Latino candidate, while the X axis represents the percent of the voting-age population that is Latino within each precinct. This analysis offers a graphic presentation to the reader and allows us to asses two important characteristics of racial block voting. First, are there any outliers? That is, the means and coefficients reported here are akin to averages, and could hide precincts that do not conform to the overall observed behavior. Second, how similar to one another are the Latino (or non-Latino) precincts? Are they neatly arranged around similar point estimates close to one another, or are they "all over the map?"

The scatter plots clearly demonstrate that a strong and linear relationship exists between Latino population and votes in favor of the Latino candidates. This pattern is obvious all the Latino candidates. As the Latino population within a precinct increases – from left to right on the X axis – the percentage of the vote won by the Latino candidate grows. This trend is consistent for 15 of the 16 Latino candidates, across all three districts. Thus, in 45 separate analyses in different geographies across Los Angeles County, we find non-Latinos voting against a variety of Latino candidates, while Latinos uniformly vote in support of them.

Polarized voting is most clear in status quo District 3, although it is evident in the other two districts as well. In District 3, heavily Latino precincts are clustered near each other, showing strong support for the Latino candidates, with no instances of outliers (meaning no Latino precincts ever voted against the Latino candidates). This suggests that Latino voters do prefer descriptive representation, across a variety of different candidates and election types. Further, the non-Latino precincts also tend to cluster together in opposition to the Latino candidates (the only exception is Aceves). The most notable examples of racial block voting are the Delgadillo and Garcia elections, both of which demonstrate a clear linear relationship between race and vote choice in Los Angeles County.

Figure 1A:




Figure 1B:




Figure 1C:




Figure 1D:




Figure 1E:




Figure 1F:




Figure 1G:




Figure 1H:




Figure 1I:




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


Figure 1K:




Figure 1L:




Figure 1M:




Figure 1N:




Figure 10:




Figure 1P:




Figure 1Q:




Figure 1R:




Figure 1S:





Figure 1T:



Kings' Ecological Inference & Goodman's Regression

Gary King's 1997 book and the programming package that accompanies it are an effort to solve some of the more persistent problems associated with estimating individual level behavior from aggregate level information. The summary statistics produced by the program are included in the next sequence of tables, along with estimates of support based upon Leo Goodman's (1953) regression. In both cases, the columns headed with "Beta B" indicate the estimated proportion of Latino support for the Latino candidate in each district listed to the left hand side. "Beta W" on the other hand, is the estimate of non-Latino support. Both can be interpreted as percentage of the vote won. While both the King and Goodman techniques are estimated similarly, King's analysis software using a bounding method that prevents estimates from going above 100 or below 0 percent of the vote.

As should be immediately clear, in the 2010 Primary Election all sets of estimates are very similar. Under both the King and Goodman approaches, the election shows a large degree of polarized voting. For all seven contests, in each of the three districts, Latino candidates were clearly preferred among Latino voters and almost never the preferred candidate among non-Latinos. Out of the 16 candidates in 3 districts (48 estimates), we find only two candidates, Aceves and Noguez who received more non-Latino votes than Latino votes. Thus, for the other 14 candidates, in all three districts measured (42 of 48 models) we find strong, and statistically significant evidence of racially polarized.

Table 3A: Ecological Inference and Ecological Regression Estimated Vote for Latino Candidates, Status Quo District 3

	King		Good	dman
Candidate	Beta B	Beta W	Beta B	Beta W
Nava	0.157	0.071	.143	.068
Torrico	0.179	0.085	.163	.081
Delgadillo	0.508	0.110	.462	.105
AG Latino total	0.846	0.268	.769	.255
De la Torre	0.603	0.228	.548	.217
Garcia	0.498	0.097	.453	.092
Moreno	0.300	0.173	.273	.165
J28 Latino total	0.800	0.270	.727	.257
De los Reyes	0.434	0.165	0.413	0.157
Griego	0.449	0.257	.408	.245
Aceves	0.026	0.246	.024	.234
Gutierrez	0.230	0.050	.209	.048
Romero	0.600	0.170	.545	.162
SPI Latino total	0.751	0.467	.683	.445
Chavez	0.138	0.015	0.131	0.014
Cornejo	0.095	0.006	0.090	0.005
Gomez	0.142	0.008	0.135	0.006
Salazar	0.190	0.070	0.181	0.067
Noguez	0.183	0.179	0.174	0.170
ASR Latino total	0.747	0.275	0.711	0.262

Table 3B: Ecological Inference and Ecological Regression Estimated Vote for Latino Candidates, Status Quo District 4

	Ki	King		dman
Candidate	Beta B	Beta W	Beta B	Beta W
Nava	0.207	0.048	0.188	0.046
Torrico	0.233	0.076	0.212	0.072
Delgadillo	0.449	0.102	0.408	0.097
AG Latino total	0.891	0.227	0.810	0.216
De la Torre	0.760	0.249	0.691	0.237
Garcia	0.443	0.123	0.403	0.117
Moreno	0.311	0.124	0.283	0.118
J28 Latino total	0.757	0.247	0.688	0.235
De los Reyes	0.366	0.135	0.349	0.129
Griego	0.419	0.289	0.381	0.275
Aceves	0.034	0.292	0.031	0.278
Gutierrez	0.221	0.059	0.201	0.056
Romero	0.458	0.101	0.416	0.096
SPI Latino total	0.678	0.452	0.616	0.430
Chavez	0.181	0.007	0.172	0.005
Cornejo	0.137	0.012	0.131	0.011
Gomez	0.046	0.020	0.044	0.019
Salazar	0.202	0.071	0.192	0.068
Noguez	0.122	0.214	0.116	0.204
ASR Latino total	0.690	0.324	0.657	0.309

Table 3C: Ecological Inference and Ecological Regression Estimated Vote for Latino Candidates, Status Quo District 5

	Ki	ng	Good	dman
Candidate	Beta B	Beta W	Beta B	Beta W
Nava	0.226	0.054	0.205	0.051
Torrico	0.223	0.110	0.203	0.105
Delgadillo	0.395	0.101	0.359	0.096
AG Latino total	0.846	0.266	0.769	0.253
De la Torre	0.705	0.197	0.641	0.188
Garcia	0.432	0.111	0.393	0.106
Moreno	0.383	0.107	0.348	0.102
J28 Latino total	0.817	0.218	0.743	0.208
De los Reyes	0.380	0.184	0.362	0.175
Griego	0.378	0.293	0.344	0.279
Aceves	0.021	0.282	0.019	0.269
Gutierrez	0.293	0.079	0.266	0.075
Romero	0.539	0.096	0.490	0.091
SPI Latino total	0.688	0.457	0.625	0.435
Chavez	0.265	0.008	0.252	0.003
Cornejo	0.091	0.012	0.087	0.011
Gomez	0.085	0.015	0.081	0.014
Salazar	0.201	0.044	0.191	0.042
Noguez	0.106	0.225	0.101	0.214
ASR Latino total	0.747	0.298	0.711	0.284

The ecological inference and ecological regression analysis found in table 3 is perhaps the most rigorous, and also the most clear substantiation of racially polarized voting in Los Angeles County. Consistent with previous analysis from 1994 – 2009, we find significant and abundant evidence of racial block voting in 2010 across all three supervisor districts in question. The estimates reveal that Latino voters consistently favored the Latino candidates.

ELECTABILITY OF LATINO CANDIDATES

The evidence presented above demonstrates a clear pattern of racially polarized voting in Status Quo Supervisor Districts 3, 4, and 5. Through four methods of analysis, the results show that Latino voters are attempting to elect Latino candidates, while non-Latino voters are systematically voting against such candidates. Racial block voting is only half of the story though. A successful case must also prove that Latino candidates are indeed electable in the alternative demonstration districts. Here, we provide a summary review of how each of the 16 Latino candidates fared in the five Status Quo districts as compared to the five LACCEA demonstration districts, dated September 2003 and July 2002 (for July 2002 tables, see appendix). The percentages are derived by summing the total number of votes each candidate won in each precinct by Supervisor district. In particular, the reader should focus on the percent of the vote won by Latino candidates in the existing Supervisor Districts 3, 4, and 5 as compared to LACCEA's September 2003 demonstration District 3 – the second potential Latino district.

Table 4 reveals two important patterns. First, comparing the current Latino district in the Status Quo and LACCEA September 2003 plan, Latino candidates are consistently favored throughout District 1. Even where a Latino candidate, or candidates did not reach the 50% threshold, they are always the first choice and would force a runoff. Across all seven different elections analyzed, Latinos retain electability in all contests in the LACCEA first supervisorial district map. Thus, we conclude that Latino electability in the first district is not diminished under the LACCEA proposal. These findings hold for both versions of the LACCEA proposed districts maps, dated July 2002 as well as September 2003 – Latino electability remains very strong.

The second important finding in Table 4 is that LACCEA September 2003 District 3 proves a second Latino district can exist. Table 4 shows that as compared to Status Quo Districts 3, 4, and 5, Latino candidates won significantly more votes in LACCEA District 3 across the board. Further, for all seven elections studied here, the Latino candidates would have either won, or forced a runoff in every instance in the proposed district. For example, in superior justice position 28, while the Latinos combined for 44% of the vote, there were actually the first and second choice in the LACCEA revised district 3, against a total of eight candidates. Thus, the

runoff election would have been Garcia versus Moreno under the LACCEA plan. This trend is consistent across all elections whereby the LACCEA plan dramatically improves the electability of Spanish surname candidates in partisan primaries, judicial races, and non-partisan county offices. For both the July 2002 district plan, and the September 2003 district plan, in every instance, we find strong evidence that a Latino candidate would be considered electable, in this a second majority Latino district, being offered by LACCEA. The re-aggregated election results for the five countywide Latino candidates strongly demonstrate that they each did significantly better in LACCEA's September 2003 and July 2002 alternative Board of Supervisor's District 3 as compared to their percentages in the current Supervisor Districts 3, 4 and 5. Latino candidates won outright in two contests, and were in second place in two elections, in the LACCEA District 3. Further, Latino candidates remain readily electable in the LACCEA alternative District 1, therefore providing two districts with a majority Latino population and the propensity to elect a Latino candidate to office.

African American Electability in District 2

A second issue to consider is what impact, if any, the LACCEA alternative districting plans have on the electability of African American candidates in the 2nd Supervisorial district. In a previous report we demonstrated that the re-structured 2nd district continued to vote in favor of African American candidates in the presidential primary election between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. Here we demonstrate once again that African American candidates retain very strong electability under the two LACCEA district plans. When looking at the Democratic primary contest for Attorney General, we can compare the total votes won by Kamala Harris, an African American, who ultimately won the election. In the current status quo second district, Harris was the preferred candidate winning 45.2% of the vote in a crowded 7-person primary. The vote share for Harris increases substantially under both the September 2003 district map (where she won 50.1%), and the July 2002 district map (where she won 51.3%). In no other district in Los Angeles is Harris as electable as in the two LACCEA proposed districts, making them the best opportunity for African American representation. The data provides very strong evidence that the precincts which compose the new districts under the LACCEA plans

protect African American electability, and in fact, enhance the probability of Black candidates winning election over the current status quo districts.

Table 4. Percent Vote Won by Latino Candidates in June 2010
[Sorted by L.A. County Supervisor Districts]

Status Quo Supervisor District # 1			LACCEA Se	pt 2003 Dis	trict # 1
<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won	<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won
Nava	AG	15.0%	Nava	AG	15.0%
Torrico	AG	15.3%	Torrico	AG	13.6%
Delgadillo	AG	32.3%	Delgadillo	AG	31.7%
Latino comb'd	AG	62.6%	Latino comb'd	AG	60.3%
Harris	AG	15.4%	Harris	AG	17.8%
Kelly	AG	10.7%	Kelly	AG	11.0%
Lieu	AG	7.9%	Lieu	AG	3.1%
Schmier	AG	3.4%	Schmier	AG	2.8%
De la Torre	INS	61.2%	De la Torre	INS	62.4%
Jones	INS	38.8%	Jones	INS	37.6%
Garcia	J-28	22.2%	Garcia	J-28	22.7%
Moreno	J-28	21.1%	Moreno	J-28	24.0%
Latino comb'd	J-28	43.3%	Latino comb'd	J-28	46.7%
Hammock	J-28	15.9%	Hammock	J-28	15.2%
De los Reyes	J-107	40.6%	De los Reyes	J-107	39.1%
Salkin	J-107	42.9%	Salkin	J-107	43.2%
Bolinger	J-107	16.5%	Bolinger	J-107	17.7%
Griego	J-117	34.8%	Griego	J-117	35.2%
Schneider	J-117	33.8%	Schneider	J-117	34.8%
Aceves	SPI	12.8%	Aceves	SPI	14.6%
Romero	SPI	36.5%	Romero	SPI	35.2%
Gutierrez	SPI	12.9%	Gutierrez	SPI	12.8%
Latino comb'd	SPI	62.2%	Latino comb'd	SPI	62.6%
Torlakson	SPI	12.3%	Torlakson	SPI	13.9%
Noguez	ASR	23.7%	Noguez	ASR	25.5%
Salazar	ASR	16.1%	Salazar	ASR	16.9%
Chavez	ASR	12.2%	Chavez	ASR	10.2%
Gomez	ASR	6.2%	Gomez	ASR	5.9%
Cornejo	ASR	6.2%	Cornejo	ASR	6.9%
Latino Comb'd	ASR	64.3%	Latino Comb'd	ASR	65.4%
Wong	ASR	11.2%	Wong	ASR	10.7%

INS – 2 total candidates

J-28 – 8 total candidates

J-107 – 3 total candidates

J-117 – 4 total candidates

SPI – 12 total candidates

Table 4. Percent Vote Won by Latino Candidates in June 2010
[Sorted by L.A. County Supervisor Districts]

Status Quo Supervisor District # 2			LACCEA Se	pt 2003 Dis	trict # 2
<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won	<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won
Nava	AG	7.6%	Nava	AG	7.7%
Torrico	AG	8.4%	Torrico	AG	8.2%
Delgadillo	AG	18.2%	Delgadillo	AG	19.4%
Latino comb'd	AG	34.2%	Latino comb'd	AG	35.3%
Harris	AG	45.2%	Harris	AG	50.1%
Kelly	AG	9.9%	Kelly	AG	8.0%
Lieu	AG	7.6%	Lieu	AG	5.1%
Schmier	AG	3.2%	Schmier	AG	1.4%
De la Torre	INS	45.6%	De la Torre	INS	45.7%
Jones	INS	54.4%	Jones	INS	54.3%
Garcia	J-28	11.0%	Garcia	J-28	12.1%
Moreno	J-28	11.7%	Moreno	J-28	12.5%
Latino comb'd	J-28	22.7%	Latino comb'd	J-28	24.6%
Hammock	J-28	16.3%	Hammock	J-28	15.9%
De los Reyes	J-107	37.7%	De los Reyes	J-107	35.8%
Salkin	J-107	44.1%	Salkin	J-107	46.2%
Bolinger	J-107	18.2%	Bolinger	J-107	18.0%
Griego	J-117	31.0%	Griego	J-117	31.3%
Schneider	J-117	41.4%	Schneider	J-117	41.7%
Aceves	SPI	12.0%	Aceves	SPI	11.6%
Romero	SPI	37.9%	Romero	SPI	38.4%
Gutierrez	SPI	7.4%	Gutierrez	SPI	7.9%
Latino comb'd	SPI	57.3%	Latino comb'd	SPI	57.9%
Torlakson	SPI	13.0%	Torlakson	SPI	13.6%
Noguez	ASR	35.1%	Noguez	ASR	35.5%
Salazar	ASR	10.4%	Salazar	ASR	10.4%
Chavez	ASR	4.7%	Chavez	ASR	4.9%
Gomez	ASR	4.2%	Gomez	ASR	4.2%
Cornejo	ASR	3.5%	Cornejo	ASR	3.5%
Latino Comb'd	ASR	58.0%	Latino Comb'd	ASR	58.5%
Wong	ASR	12.2%	Wong	ASR	11.3%

INS – 2 total candidates

J-28 - 8 total candidates

J-107 – 3 total candidates

J-117 - 4 total candidates

SPI – 12 total candidates

Table 4. Percent Vote Won by Latino Candidates in June 2010
[Sorted by L.A. County Supervisor Districts]

Status Quo Supervisor District # 3			LACCEA Se	pt 2003 Dis	trict #3
<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won	<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won
Nava	AG	9.4%	Nava	AG	12.8%
Torrico	AG	10.6%	Torrico	AG	15.3%
Delgadillo	AG	18.1%	Delgadillo	AG	24.3%
Latino comb'd	AG	38.2%	Latino comb'd	AG	51.4%
Harris	AG	33.7%	Harris	AG	21.1%
Kelly	AG	13.9%	Kelly	AG	9.3%
Lieu	AG	10.4%	Lieu	AG	14.1%
Schmier	AG	3.8%	Schmier	AG	3.1%
De la Torre	INS	42.4%	De la Torre	INS	59.1%
Jones	INS	57.6%	Jones	INS	40.9%
Garcia	J-28	11.1%	Garcia	J-28	23.7%
Moreno	J-28	13.1%	Moreno	J-28	20.3%
Latino comb'd	J-28	24.2%	Latino comb'd	J-28	44.0%
Hammock	J-28	26.2%	Hammock	J-28	16.9%
De los Reyes	J-107	29.2%	De los Reyes	J-107	48.2%
Salkin	J-107	53.6%	Salkin	J-107	34.7%
Bolinger	J-107	17.2%	Bolinger	J-107	17.1%
Griego	J-117	27.1%	Griego	J-117	38.2%
Schneider	J-117	47.2%	Schneider	J-117	36.2%
Aceves	SPI	20.9%	Aceves	SPI	15.3%
Romero	SPI	20.2%	Romero	SPI	31.9%
Gutierrez	SPI	6.9%	Gutierrez	SPI	12.3%
Latino comb'd	SPI	47.9%	Latino comb'd	SPI	59.5%
Torlakson	SPI	18.2%	Torlakson	SPI	14.7%
Noguez	ASR	25.8%	Noguez	ASR	19.5%
Salazar	ASR	10.0%	Salazar	ASR	14.4%
Chavez	ASR	4.2%	Chavez	ASR	9.4%
Gomez	ASR	4.7%	Gomez	ASR	8.3%
Cornejo	ASR	2.8%	Cornejo	ASR	4.7%
Latino Comb'd	ASR	47.5%	Latino Comb'd	ASR	56.3%
Wong	ASR	16.0%	Wong	ASR	12.5%

INS – 2 total candidates

J-28 – 8 total candidates

J-107 – 3 total candidates

J-117 - 4 total candidates

SPI – 12 total candidates

Table 4. Percent Vote Won by Latino Candidates in June 2010
[Sorted by L.A. County Supervisor Districts]

Status Quo Supervisor District # 4			LACCEA Sept 2003 District # 4		
<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won	<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won
Nava	AG	8.8%	Nava	AG	7.0%
Torrico	AG	11.3%	Torrico	AG	9.0%
Delgadillo	AG	18.1%	Delgadillo	AG	14.5%
Latino comb'd	AG	38.2%	Latino comb'd	AG	30.6%
Harris	AG	23.0%	Harris	AG	24.1%
Kelly	AG	14.8%	Kelly	AG	23.6%
Lieu	AG	20.0%	Lieu	AG	16.8%
Schmier	AG	4.0%	Schmier	AG	4.7%
De la Torre	INS	49.4%	De la Torre	INS	42.5%
Jones	INS	50.6%	Jones	INS	57.5%
Garcia	J-28	13.4%	Garcia	J-28	10.7%
Moreno	J-28	11.5%	Moreno	J-28	9.2%
Latino comb'd	J-28	24.9%	Latino comb'd	J-28	19.9%
Hammock	J-28	23.2%	Hammock	J-28	25.6%
De los Reyes	J-107	30.0%	De los Reyes	J-107	26.3%
Salkin	J-107	51.6%	Salkin	J-107	54.4%
Bolinger	J-107	18.4%	Bolinger	J-107	19.3%
Griego	J-117	29.7%	Griego	J-117	24.8%
Schneider	J-117	44.5%	Schneider	J-117	47.7%
Aceves	SPI	23.2%	Aceves	SPI	24.1%
Romero	SPI	17.1%	Romero	SPI	13.7%
Gutierrez	SPI	10.3%	Gutierrez	SPI	8.2%
Latino comb'd	SPI	50.5%	Latino comb'd	SPI	46.0%
Torlakson	SPI	13.2%	Torlakson	SPI	15.6%
Noguez	ASR	26.5%	Noguez	ASR	25.6%
Salazar	ASR	9.8%	Salazar	ASR	7.8%
Chavez	ASR	4.1%	Chavez	ASR	3.3%
Gomez	ASR	4.8%	Gomez	ASR	3.8%
Cornejo	ASR	2.7%	Cornejo	ASR	2.2%
Latino Comb'd	ASR	47.9%	Latino Comb'd	ASR	42.7%
Wong	ASR	11.3%	Wong	ASR	13.3%

INS – 2 total candidates

J-28 – 8 total candidates

J-107 – 3 total candidates

J-117 - 4 total candidates

SPI – 12 total candidates

Table 4. Percent Vote Won by Latino Candidates in June 2010
[Sorted by L.A. County Supervisor Districts]

Status Quo Supervisor District # 5			LACCEA Sept 2003 District # 5		
<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won	<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won
Nava	AG	8.8%	Nava	AG	8.6%
Torrico	AG	12.9%	Torrico	AG	12.6%
Delgadillo	AG	18.3%	Delgadillo	AG	17.9%
Latino comb'd	AG	40.0%	Latino comb'd	AG	39.2%
Harris	AG	27.9%	Harris	AG	27.3%
Kelly	AG	16.4%	Kelly	AG	17.3%
Lieu	AG	10.9%	Lieu	AG	11.1%
Schmier	AG	4.9%	Schmier	AG	5.2%
De la Torre	INS	43.2%	De la Torre	INS	42.3%
Jones	INS	56.8%	Jones	INS	57.7%
Garcia	J-28	11.7%	Garcia	J-28	11.5%
Moreno	J-28	10.4%	Moreno	J-28	10.2%
Latino comb'd	J-28	22.1%	Latino comb'd	J-28	21.7%
Hammock	J-28	23.7%	Hammock	J-28	23.9%
De los Reyes	J-107	27.4%	De los Reyes	J-107	26.9%
Salkin	J-107	55.4%	Salkin	J-107	55.3%
Bolinger	J-107	17.2%	Bolinger	J-107	17.8%
Griego	J-117	29.1%	Griego	J-117	28.5%
Schneider	J-117	46.9%	Schneider	J-117	47.2%
Aceves	SPI	22.1%	Aceves	SPI	21.7%
Romero	SPI	16.9%	Romero	SPI	16.6%
Gutierrez	SPI	8.3%	Gutierrez	SPI	8.1%
Latino comb'd	SPI	42.7%	Latino comb'd	SPI	41.8%
Torlakson	SPI	15.1%	Torlakson	SPI	15.5%
Noguez	ASR	28.1%	Noguez	ASR	27.5%
Salazar	ASR	9.3%	Salazar	ASR	9.1%
Chavez	ASR	4.0%	Chavez	ASR	3.9%
Gomez	ASR	3.0%	Gomez	ASR	2.9%
Cornejo	ASR	2.2%	Cornejo	ASR	2.2%
Latino Comb'd	ASR	46.6%	Latino Comb'd	ASR	45.7%
Wong	ASR	12.7%	Wong	ASR	13.8%

INS – 2 total candidates

J-28 – 8 total candidates

J-107 – 3 total candidates

J-117 - 4 total candidates

SPI – 12 total candidates

CONCLUSIONS

We have offered several different approaches that each tell a remarkably similar story about the degree to which polarized voting exists in Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Districts. Recall that, paraphrasing Justice Brennan's opinion in *Gingles*, racially polarized voting can be identified as occurring when there is a consistent relationship between the race of a voter and the way in which she votes. In this case, there is a clear and consistent pattern; Latino voters always preferred Latino candidates while non-Latinos did not. Under every different method we have employed here, this pattern remains robust and consistent. These results demonstrate that not only are Latinos politically cohesive in their support of Latino candidates in Los Angeles County, but also that non-Latinos vote consistently against Latino candidates in 2010. While our previous reports have demonstrated this pattern during the 1990s and early 2000s, the findings reported here clearly show that the pattern of racial block voting against Latino candidates continues to exist well into the 21st century. Further, the electability analysis clearly shows that a Latino candidate should be favored to win in LACCEA's Board of Supervisor District 3 if their alternative plan is adopted by the Federal courts. When we re-aggregate the votes in recent elections, Latino candidates would win outright, or force a runoff under the LACCEA's revised 3rd Supervisor district suggesting once again, that should a district be drawn in the San Gabriel Valley, it is very likely that a Latino would run, and win. Finally, it is clear that any concerns over decreased electability of African-American candidates in LACCEA's July 2002 and September 2003 alternative Los Angeles County Board of Supervisor maps as prepared by Alan Clayton are incorrect. In fact, the election data results signficantly demonstrates the increased electability of African-American candidates under the two alternative District 2 maps as prepared by Alan Clayton on behalf of LACCEA. This very recent highly contested election with seven candidates demonstrates that LACCEA alternative District 2 maps both show electability for Latinos in both District 1 and District 3 while strengthing the opportunity for the election of an African-American candidate in District 2.

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APPENDIX I: ALTERNATE LACCEA DISTRICTS – JULY 2002

Appendix Percent Vote Won by Latino Candidates in June 2010 [Sorted by L.A. County Supervisor Districts]

Status Quo Supervisor District # 1			LACCEA July 2002 District # 1			
Candidate	Office	% Won	Candidate	Office	% Won	
Nava	AG	15.0%	Nava	AG	14.6%	
Torrico	AG	15.3%	Torrico	AG	13.2%	
Delgadillo	AG	32.3%	Delgadillo	AG	30.7%	
Latino comb'd	AG	62.6%	Latino comb'd	AG	58.5%	
Harris	AG	15.4%	Harris	AG	18.0%	
Kelly	AG	10.7%	Kelly	AG	10.8%	
Lieu	AG	7.9%	Lieu	AG	3.3%	
Schmier	AG	3.4%	Schmier	AG	2.8%	
De la Torre	INS	61.2%	De la Torre	INS	60.5%	
Jones	INS	38.8%	Jones	INS	39.5%	
Garcia	J-28	22.2%	Garcia	J-28	22.0%	
Moreno	J-28	21.1%	Moreno	J-28	23.3%	
Latino comb'd	J-28	43.3%	Latino comb'd	J-28	45.3%	
Hammock	J-28	15.9%	Hammock	J-28	15.4%	
De los Reyes	J-107	40.6%	De los Reyes	J-107	38.1%	
Salkin	J-107	42.9%	Salkin	J-107	43.7%	
Bolinger	J-107	16.5%	Bolinger	J-107	18.2%	
Griego	J-117	34.8%	Griego	J-117	34.5%	
Schneider	J-117	33.8%	Schneider	J-117	33.8%	
Aceves	SPI	12.8%	Aceves	SPI	14.7%	
Romero	SPI	36.5%	Romero	SPI	34.1%	
Gutierrez	SPI	12.9%	Gutierrez	SPI	12.4%	
Latino comb'd	SPI	62.2%	Latino comb'd	SPI	61.3%	
Torlakson	SPI	12.3%	Torlakson	SPI	13.5%	
Noguez	ASR	23.7%	Noguez	ASR	24.7%	
Salazar	ASR	16.1%	Salazar	ASR	16.4%	
Chavez	ASR	12.2%	Chavez	ASR	9.9%	
Gomez	ASR	6.2%	Gomez	ASR	5.7%	
Cornejo	ASR	6.2%	Cornejo	ASR	6.7%	
Latino Comb'd	ASR	64.3%	Latino Comb'd	ASR	63.4%	
Wong	ASR	11.2%	Wong	ASR	11.0%	

AG – 7 total candidates

INS - 2 total candidates

J-28 - 8 total candidates

J-107 - 3 total candidates

J-117 - 4 total candidates

SPI – 12 total candidates

Status Quo Supervisor District # 2			LACCEA July 2002 District # 2		
<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won	<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won
Nava	AG	7.6%	Nava	AG	7.5%
Torrico	AG	8.4%	Torrico	AG	9.0%
Delgadillo	AG	18.2%	Delgadillo	AG	19.0%
Latino comb'd	AG	34.2%	Latino comb'd	AG	35.6%
Harris	AG	45.2%	Harris	AG	51.3%
Kelly	AG	9.9%	Kelly	AG	8.5%
Lieu	AG	7.6%	Lieu	AG	4.7%
Schmier	AG	3.2%	Schmier	AG	1.3%
De la Torre	INS	45.6%	De la Torre	INS	44.8%
Jones	INS	54.4%	Jones	INS	55.2%
Garcia	J-28	11.0%	Garcia	J-28	11.9%
Moreno	J-28	11.7%	Moreno	J-28	12.3%
Latino comb'd	J-28	22.7%	Latino comb'd	J-28	24.1%
Hammock	J-28	16.3%	Hammock	J-28	16.1%
De los Reyes	J-107	37.7%	De los Reyes	J-107	35.1%
Salkin	J-107	44.1%	Salkin	J-107	46.4%
Bolinger	J-107	18.2%	Bolinger	J-107	18.5%
Griego	J-117	31.0%	Griego	J-117	30.7%
Schneider	J-117	41.4%	Schneider	J-117	42.8%
Aceves	SPI	12.0%	Aceves	SPI	11.4%
Romero	SPI	37.9%	Romero	SPI	37.6%
Gutierrez	SPI	7.4%	Gutierrez	SPI	7.7%
Latino comb'd	SPI	57.3%	Latino comb'd	SPI	56.7%
Torlakson	SPI	13.0%	Torlakson	SPI	14.1%
Noguez	ASR	35.1%	Noguez	ASR	36.2%
Salazar	ASR	10.4%	Salazar	ASR	10.2%
Chavez	ASR	4.7%	Chavez	ASR	4.1%
Gomez	ASR	4.2%	Gomez	ASR	4.1%
Cornejo	ASR	3.5%	Cornejo	ASR	3.4%
Latino Comb'd	ASR	58.0%	Latino Comb'd	ASR	58.0%
Wong	ASR	12.2%	Wong	ASR	12.2%

AG - 7 total candidates

INS – 2 total candidates

J-28 – 8 total candidates

J-107 – 3 total candidates

J-117 – 4 total candidates

SPI – 12 total candidates

Status Quo Supervisor District # 3			LACCEA July 2002 District # 3		
Candidate	Office Property	% Won	<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won
Nava	AG	9.4%	Nava	AG	12.5%
Torrico	AG	10.6%	Torrico	AG	15.0%
Delgadillo	AG	18.1%	Delgadillo	AG	23.8%
Latino comb'd	AG	38.2%	Latino comb'd	AG	50.4%
Harris	AG	33.7%	Harris	AG	20.5%
Kelly	AG	13.9%	Kelly	AG	9.8%
Lieu	AG	10.4%	Lieu	AG	13.5%
Schmier	AG	3.8%	Schmier	AG	3.1%
De la Torre	INS	42.4%	De la Torre	INS	57.9%
Jones	INS	57.6%	Jones	INS	42.1%
Garcia	J-28	11.1%	Garcia	J-28	23.2%
Moreno	J-28	13.1%	Moreno	J-28	19.9%
Latino comb'd	J-28	24.2%	Latino comb'd	J-28	43.1%
Hammock	J-28	26.2%	Hammock	J-28	17.2%
De los Reyes	J-107	29.2%	De los Reyes	J-107	47.2%
Salkin	J-107	53.6%	Salkin	J-107	35.5%
Bolinger	J-107	17.2%	Bolinger	J-107	17.3%
Griego	J-117	27.1%	Griego	J-117	37.4%
Schneider	J-117	47.2%	Schneider	J-117	36.5%
Aceves	SPI	20.9%	Aceves	SPI	16.0%
Romero	SPI	20.2%	Romero	SPI	31.3%
Gutierrez	SPI	6.9%	Gutierrez	SPI	12.1%
Latino comb'd	SPI	47.9%	Latino comb'd	SPI	59.3%
Torlakson	SPI	18.2%	Torlakson	SPI	14.4%
Noguez	ASR	25.8%	Noguez	ASR	19.8%
Salazar	ASR	10.0%	Salazar	ASR	14.1%
Chavez	ASR	4.2%	Chavez	ASR	9.2%
Gomez	ASR	4.7%	Gomez	ASR	8.1%
Cornejo	ASR	2.8%	Cornejo	ASR	4.6%
Latino Comb'd	ASR	47.5%	Latino Comb'd	ASR	55.9%
Wong	ASR	16.0%	Wong	ASR	13.3%

AG - 7 total candidates

INS – 2 total candidates

J-28 – 8 total candidates

J-107 – 3 total candidates

J-117 - 4 total candidates

SPI – 12 total candidates

Status Quo Supervisor District # 4			LACCEA July 2002 District # 4		
<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won	<u>Candidate</u>	Office Property	% Won
Nava	AG	8.8%	Nava	AG	7.1%
Torrico	AG	11.3%	Torrico	AG	9.2%
Delgadillo	AG	18.1%	Delgadillo	AG	14.8%
Latino comb'd	AG	38.2%	Latino comb'd	AG	31.2%
Harris	AG	23.0%	Harris	AG	24.6%
Kelly	AG	14.8%	Kelly	AG	24.8%
Lieu	AG	20.0%	Lieu	AG	16.0%
Schmier	AG	4.0%	Schmier	AG	4.3%
De la Torre	INS	49.4%	De la Torre	INS	43.4%
Jones	INS	50.6%	Jones	INS	56.6%
Garcia	J-28	13.4%	Garcia	J-28	10.9%
Moreno	J-28	11.5%	Moreno	J-28	9.4%
Latino comb'd	J-28	24.9%	Latino comb'd	J-28	20.3%
Hammock	J-28	23.2%	Hammock	J-28	26.1%
De los Reyes	J-107	30.0%	De los Reyes	J-107	26.8%
Salkin	J-107	51.6%	Salkin	J-107	55.5%
Bolinger	J-107	18.4%	Bolinger	J-107	17.5%
Griego	J-117	29.7%	Griego	J-117	25.3%
Schneider	J-117	44.5%	Schneider	J-117	48.7%
Aceves	SPI	23.2%	Aceves	SPI	24.6%
Romero	SPI	17.1%	Romero	SPI	14.0%
Gutierrez	SPI	10.3%	Gutierrez	SPI	8.4%
Latino comb'd	SPI	50.5%	Latino comb'd	SPI	46.9%
Torlakson	SPI	13.2%	Torlakson	SPI	15.9%
Noguez	ASR	26.5%	Noguez	ASR	26.1%
Salazar	ASR	9.8%	Salazar	ASR	8.0%
Chavez	ASR	4.1%	Chavez	ASR	3.4%
Gomez	ASR	4.8%	Gomez	ASR	3.9%
Cornejo	ASR	2.7%	Cornejo	ASR	2.2%
Latino Comb'd	ASR	47.9%	Latino Comb'd	ASR	43.6%
Wong	ASR	11.3%	Wong	ASR	13.6%

AG - 7 total candidates

INS – 2 total candidates

J-28 – 8 total candidates

J-107 – 3 total candidates

J-117 - 4 total candidates

SPI – 12 total candidates

Status Quo Supervisor District # 5			LACCEA July 2002 District # 5		
<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Office</u>	% Won	<u>Candidate</u>	Office	% Won
Nava	AG	8.8%	Nava	AG	8.4%
Torrico	AG	12.9%	Torrico	AG	12.3%
Delgadillo	AG	18.3%	Delgadillo	AG	17.5%
Latino comb'd	AG	40.0%	Latino comb'd	AG	38.4%
Harris	AG	27.9%	Harris	AG	26.8%
Kelly	AG	16.4%	Kelly	AG	17.1%
Lieu	AG	10.9%	Lieu	AG	11.2%
Schmier	AG	4.9%	Schmier	AG	5.3%
De la Torre	INS	43.2%	De la Torre	INS	41.5%
Jones	INS	56.8%	Jones	INS	58.5%
Garcia	J-28	11.7%	Garcia	J-28	11.3%
Moreno	J-28	10.4%	Moreno	J-28	10.0%
Latino comb'd	J-28	22.1%	Latino comb'd	J-28	21.3%
Hammock	J-28	23.7%	Hammock	J-28	24.5%
De los Reyes	J-107	27.4%	De los Reyes	J-107	27.4%
Salkin	J-107	55.4%	Salkin	J-107	54.2%
Bolinger	J-107	17.2%	Bolinger	J-107	18.4%
Griego	J-117	29.1%	Griego	J-117	27.9%
Schneider	J-117	46.9%	Schneider	J-117	46.3%
Aceves	SPI	22.1%	Aceves	SPI	21.3%
Romero	SPI	16.9%	Romero	SPI	16.3%
Gutierrez	SPI	8.3%	Gutierrez	SPI	7.9%
Latino comb'd	SPI	42.7%	Latino comb'd	SPI	41.0%
Torlakson	SPI	15.1%	Torlakson	SPI	17.7%
Noguez	ASR	28.1%	Noguez	ASR	27.0%
Salazar	ASR	9.3%	Salazar	ASR	8.9%
Chavez	ASR	4.0%	Chavez	ASR	3.8%
Gomez	ASR	3.0%	Gomez	ASR	2.8%
Cornejo	ASR	2.2%	Cornejo	ASR	2.2%
Latino Comb'd	ASR	46.6%	Latino Comb'd	ASR	44.8%
Wong	ASR	12.7%	Wong	ASR	15.5%

AG - 7 total candidates

INS – 2 total candidates

J-28 – 8 total candidates

J-107 – 3 total candidates

J-117 - 4 total candidates

SPI – 12 total candidates