METROPOLITAN LATINO POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: VOTER TURNOUT AND CANDIDATE PREFERENCE IN LOS ANGELES

MATT A. BARRETO
University of California, Irvine

MARIO VILLARREAL
Claremont Graduate University

NATHAN D. WOODS
Welch Consulting

ABSTRACT: *Most research on Latino voting behavior conclusively finds that as a group, Latinos vote at lower rates than other racial and ethnic groups in the United States. In this article, we argue that given the appropriate circumstances, Latinos should be expected to vote at higher rates than other racial and ethnic groups. In particular, we think the presence of a viable Latino candidate will spur increased Latino turnout and that when Latinos candidates run for office, Latino voters will prefer the co-ethnic candidate. Analyzing precinct level returns from the Los Angeles 2001 mayoral and the 2000 presidential elections we show this may be the case. High-density Latino precincts show higher rates of turnout when Latino candidates are on the ballot, and these same precincts show heightened support for the co-ethnic candidate. In fact, for the first time ever in Los Angeles, the 2001 mayoral election witnessed Latinos voting at the highest rates of any racial or ethnic group in the city.*

"As a result of research efforts on voting behavior of Chicanos, several patterns have been identified. The more consistent findings have been significantly lower rates of voter registration and turnout than Anglo and black voters" (Garcia & Arce, 1988, p. 128).

In the decade or so since this sentiment was first expressed, the weight of literature on Latino politics and electoral behavior still finds clearly that Latinos are less likely to participate in politics than are members of other racial and ethnic groups (Arvizu & Garcia, 1996; Calvo & Rosenstone, 1989; Shaw, de la Garza, & Lee, 2000; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). The possible reasons why this statement still rings true are legion, and most are well known. Whether due to

---

demographic factors (DeSipio, 1996; Hero & Campbell 1996) or issues surrounding immigrant status and citizenship (Calvo & Rosenstone, 1989; Garcia & Arce, 1988; Uhlaner, Cain, & Kiewiet 1989), the premise that Latinos are less likely to participate than non-Latinos is now widely accepted and has been repeatedly demonstrated across time and in a variety of contexts. Indeed, a recurring conclusion drawn in the several essays devoted to the Latino vote in the 2000 pre-election volume of *PS: Political Science* is that the promise of Latino political participation remains largely unfulfilled (Affigne, 2000; Hero, Garcia, Garcia, & Pachon 2000; Marquez & Jennings, 2000; Montoya, Hardy-Fanta, & Garcia, 2000; Sierra, Carrillo, DeSipio, & Jones-Correa, 2000).

We argue that, for the most part, these works understate, or ignore, the effect of electoral context and the presence (where possible) of Latino candidates. Building on literature covering minority political behavior rooted in shared group identity and racial incorporation, we make the case that under some circumstances, Latinos should be more likely to vote than non-Latinos, and to vote for the co-ethnic candidate. Indeed the 2001 Los Angeles mayoral race between former State Assembly Speaker Antonio Villaraigosa and City Attorney James K. Hahn offers one exceptional example of such a circumstance. Through detailed analysis of turnout in this election, and close study of this election relative to the 2000 presidential contest, this work suggests that given the right set of circumstances, Latinos are more likely to turnout, to turnout at rates higher than those of non-Latinos, and to support co-ethnic candidates.

The conclusions drawn from this analysis may carry implications for locales far beyond Los Angeles. The environment present during the Los Angeles mayoral election was similar to those present recently in Houston and New York City. In these cities, Latino candidates and Latino voters generated political excitement, influenced the elections, and the result was

> Democrats and Republicans got a reminder . . . that Hispanic voters are a fast-growing and crucial swing vote tied more closely to ethnic than party loyalty. That dynamic of ethnic loyalty, which played out in very different ways in the three cities' mayoral races, could be important in many races next year (Lester, 2001, p. 1).

This argument, while couched in the Los Angeles experience, should not be seen as a description isolated to a unique event. Rather, this article potentially foreshadows the future of multicultural urban America. Latinos are no longer concentrated in the Southwest. In fully 23 states Latinos are now the largest minority population, including Washington, Idaho, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire. As Latino citizenship, registration, and voter mobilization drives increase across the country, we should not be surprised to find similar results for Latino participation and candidate preference under similar circumstances. This research is important in shedding new light on long-standing and possibly outdated notions of minority participation. As the political landscape changes in the twenty-first century and Spanish-surname candidates become more the norm in American elections, pundits and scholars alike will need to revisit the question of Latino and minority participation.

This article is presented in the following parts. First, we present our argument concerning why we can expect Latinos to turnout to vote at high rates in the 2001 Los Angeles election, why this turnout should differ from that noted in the 2000 presidential election, and why Latinos should be more supportive of Villaraigosa's candidacy. Particular attention is given to the electoral context and how it affects turnout and candidate preference. Second, we review the methodological approach and the data

employed. Third, we present a series of analyses that explore the veracity of our expectations. We conclude with some thoughts on this study's relevance for understanding Latino voting behavior more generally.

SHARED GROUP CONTEXT: CO-ETHNIC CANDIDATES AND LATINO POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

This article began by summarizing the prevailing result found in the literature: Latinos are generally less likely to participate politically than non-Latinos. In the face of this evidence a growing number of more recent works indicate that, in some circumstances, Latinos are likely to turnout at rates comparable to the turnout rates of other racial and ethnic groups (Garcia & Arce, 1988; Kauffmann, 2003). Generally, these studies build on evidence that particular contexts may lead more Latinos to become interested and involved in politics (de la Garza, Menchaca, & DeSipio, 1994; Diaz, 1996; Hritzuk & Park, 2000; Pantoja, Ramirez, & Segura, 2001). Most of these analyses find that changes in several measures of Latino participation are in part the result of the electoral environment, but they still conclude that Latinos are, on average, less likely to engage politically after taking account of the demographic and naturalization factors noted above.

Similar to these works, we suggest that when the right electoral context is present, Latinos will be more likely to participate. In the case of the 2001 Los Angeles election, a confluence of two factors leads to the expectation that the electoral context was ripe for this increase in Latino voting. The first factor was a combination of issues and circumstances covering the latter half of the 1990s and of specific import to Latinos in California. The second factor was the prominent and viable candidacy of the first Latino contestant for mayor in Los Angeles in over 100 years. While other studies on this election argue that ethnicity was not the overriding factor mobilizing Latino voters, we disagree (see Abrajano, Alvarez, & Nagler, 2003). For the first time in more than 150 years, Mexican Americans in Los Angeles had a chance to be heard.

California, Latinos and the 1990s

This article proceeds from the idea that ethnicity can be an important mobilizing force for Latinos, in contrast to previous research that downplayed the role of ethnicity. According to DeSipio (1996), while ethnicity is likely to have "no distinct impact" on political participation, there is the chance that it could emerge under "unique circumstances" or in response to "ethnic-based discrimination" (p. 9). The context in California in the 1990s, culminating in the 2001 mayoral election, offers such an example.

Beginning in 1994 with the anti-immigrant and possibly anti-Latino initiative Proposition 187 and extending through the anti-bilingual education (Proposition 209) and anti-affirmative action (Proposition 227) initiatives of 1996 and 1998, respectively, Latino politics in California has recently been a response to perceived attacks. Proposition 187 proposed to ban illegal immigrants from public social services, non-emergency health care, and public education. The initiative was couched in anti-Latino rhetoric, including one GOP state senator suggesting that all Latinos would be required to carry identification cards. Latinos quickly mobilized in near unanimous opposition. Two years after the passage of Prop. 187 an anti-affirmative action initiative (209) seeking to repeal most such programs in the areas of public contracting, jobs, and education, passed the California electorate. Exit polls found that three of four Latinos turned out against Proposition 209 (TRPI 1996). In the 1998 primary election, Latinos were again

the perceived targets of a conservative initiative (227): This time to end bilingual education in schools.

A clear result of this array of propositions is that given elite and media attention to these issues, Latinos are more likely to side with other Latinos on matters of political significance, even ones with whom they have only the term *Latino* in common. Latinos were targeted without regard to age, generational status, citizenship, language skills, and national origin. As such, these propositions and the political climate they engendered had the result of making Latinos more cohesive as a political force and more likely to weigh in on political issues directly affecting them. This description of events ties in nicely with the notion of ethnic identification or shared group consciousness, which has recently enjoyed something of a rebirth. For a time, many scholars echoed Dahl's (1961) sentiment that the "strength of ethnic ties as a factor in local politics surely must recede" (p. 33). However, research in subsequent decades continued to evidence the importance of group identification in understanding minority political behavior. While the weight of this research focused on the experience of African Americans, more recently scholars have taken up the question of how Latino groups' identity may affect political engagement. As the preceding paragraphs suggest, the particular political context present in California throughout the 1990s assured that Latino identity would remain a significant political factor for some time. In fact, evidence from a California statewide survey of Latino registrants conducted during the 2000 presidential election cycle suggested that ethnic identity remained relevant to politics. A majority of Latinos reported that they would be more likely to vote in an election when a Latino was running for office and seven in 10 stated that they would be more likely to vote in an election if Latino organizations were conducting mobilization drives (Arteaga, 2000).

The concept of group identity is rooted in attempts to resolve the question of relatively high black political participation in the face of limited political resources (Bullock, 1984; Lieske, 1984; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, & Malanchuk, 1981; Olsen, 1970; Reeves, 1997; Verba & Nie, 1972). The standard measures of such resources–income, education, and organizational membership–could not explain the participatory activities of groups disadvantaged in these areas. With standard participation models unable to account for high levels of minority participation, several authors settled on the concept of group identity as the missing ingredient. In short, the idea was simply that members of minority groups who shared an identities would be more likely to participate if they saw their group as politically disadvantaged. This theory fits the position of Latinos in the 1990s quite well.

Since Myrdal's (1944) sociological and political investigation of race relations in the South, scholars of political participation have noted the importance of race. Key's (1949) work on black politics in the South continued this tradition his focus on race as a campaign issue, paving the way for future studies of race and politics. Later, empirical work in this area focused on African Americans and found that strength of identification with the politically disadvantaged group served as a strong predictor of participation (Olsen, 1970; Verba & Nie, 1972). Significantly, these works suggest that beyond voting, various other forms of political participation, such as campaign involvement and contact with government, are also positively affected. Later work (Miller et al., 1981) built upon this research but argued that group identification, while necessary, was not sufficient. These authors develop a theory of group consciousness, which includes both group identification and an awareness of the politicized consequences of being a member of that group. Miller et al., with this more nuanced measure of group consciousness, find that the combined effect of identification and politicization does a good job predicting increases in voter turnout. Still, these analyses and others find that minority participation

as a whole lags behind that of whites (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Together, group identification and a politicized context should produce more active participation among group members. While these articles do not address Latinos specifically, their findings underscore the expectation for Latino voter turnout in 2001.

In a relatively early attempt to applying similar questions to Latino populations, Garcia, Garcia, de la Garza and Falcon (1991) began with the premise that "ethnicity may provide a structuring basis for [Latino] values, opinions and attitudes." This early research indicated that, at least in the late 1980s, a shared identity may be limited among Latino subgroups. Certainly, at minimum, the development of a pan-Latino identity of sorts is hindered by the distinct national origin and culture of the groups comprising the term *Latino*. However, as pointed out above, the particular context present in the late 1990s in California may have been sufficient for many Latinos to overcome these barriers. We argue that it was sufficient, and the product was a Latino focus on a shared political position–the clear result of a shared group identity.

More recently, Leighley (2001) extended the shared group context argument to the Latino electorate and identified three contextual influences that reduce the costs and increase the benefits of voting of Latinos. These are elite mobilization, relational goods, and racial/ethnic context; the latter two are directly applicable in this framework. The relational goods theory, developed by Uhlaner (1989), argues that various incentives exist only for the in-group members and that they depend on the interaction, or participation, of group members. In Los Angeles, where Latinos rallied around the Villaraigosa campaign and were more or less geographically concentrated in pockets of Los Angeles, we should expect the relational goods to produce elevated voter turnout among the in-group, Latinos. Second, Leighley adds the importance of ethnic environmental variables to account for a shared sense of group identity and eagerness to participate. The social context of an individual is significant because it increases the chances of ethnic mobilization and as group size increases, so too do the chances of electoral success.

Latino turnout might be higher when co-ethnic candidates are on the ballot because "minority candidates direct more resources toward mobilizing groups," or because "minority candidates change individuals' calculations of the (potential) benefits or costs of voting" (Leighley, 2001, p. 43). While public opinion surveys have shown a willingness for Latinos to support Latino candidates, the findings are hypothetical in nature (see Arteaga, 2000 for more on this study). Unfortunately, "no systematic evidence on the effects of political empowerment on Latino mobilization and participation has been documented," (Leighley, 2001, p. 43) underscoring the potential importance of the empirical findings contained in this article.

The 2001 Los Angeles Mayoral Election

The importance of the concepts discussed above, surrounding group identity and group consciousness, is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in studies of minority office holding and its effect on minority political behavior. At least since Browning, Marshall, & Tabb (1984) seminal work, we have known that cities with more minority representation on city councils or in the mayor's office also exhibit more policy responsiveness in terms of minority contracting and municipal employment. Their argument, that as minorities gain meaningful access to power in governing institutions, they obtain political representation, provides a basis for understanding minority political behavior. Building on this, several authors argue and demonstrate, that members of minority communities might be expected to respond differently in political circumstances when co-ethnic office holders

represent them. Widely understood as the empowerment or incorporation hypothesis, this suggests similarly that minority communities are more likely to be involved in politics when minority candidates have a meaningful opportunity to be elected (Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Bullock, 1984; Gilliam, 1996; Lieske, 1984; Reeves, 1997; Tate, 1993).

The 2001 mayoral election in Los Angeles took place within an environment conducive to examination through this sort of theoretical lens. A number of factors converged, including an open seat election and the presence of several well-qualified candidates. Additionally, Latinos comprised a plurality of the city's residents (according to the 2000 Census, the population of the city of Los Angeles breaks down as 47% Latino; 30% White; 11% Black; 10% Asian), and two viable Latino candidates were running for office.

Leading into the April 10, 2001 primary election, 15 candidates were bidding for the top two spots and a runoff election. Among the favorites were Republicans Steve Soboroff and Kathleen Connell and Democrats James K. Hahn, Joel Wachs, Antonio Villariagosa, and Xavier Becerra. Soboroff and Hahn were seen as the frontrunners with Soboroff having received the endorsement from outgoing Mayor Richard Riordan and Hahn the two-term city attorney, son of the renowned former Los Angeles County Board Supervisor, Kenneth Hahn. Despite the large Latino population, both Villaraigosa and Becerra were seen as unlikely to make the runoff election. Important political endorsements, including those of Governor Gray Davis, the state Democratic Party, and Labor, helped Villaraigosa to a surprise victory in the primary election, finishing with 30% of the vote. Hahn was second with 25%, leaving two Democrats to face off in the general election.

The campaign that unfolded during the general election eventually focused on racial and ethnic divisions rather than political or ideological differences. Hahn, whose father was very popular among African Americans, quickly galvanized black support and Villaraigosa unified Latino voters. The campaign reached its highest point of racial animosity when a commercial paid for by the Coalition to Elect Jim Hahn, implied that Villaraigosa supported drug use and gang violence. This probably caused some conservative white voters to leave the Villaraigosa coalition. However, it strengthened and mobilized his base of liberal and Latino voters who saw the commercial as an attack on Latinos. As the election drew near, the buzz surrounding a potential "first Latino" mayor of Los Angeles garnered national press attention and mobilized several organized get out the vote drives by organizations such as Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project (SVREP), the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO), and labor unions such as the AFL-CIO. Further, Villaraigosa was able to tap the political, economic, and media resources in Los Angeles to bring unprecedented legitimacy to his campaign in a manner similar to Henry Cisneros first run for mayor of San Antonio. Endorsements from the Los Angeles Times, Governor Gray Davis, and sitting Mayor Richard Riordan coupled with millions in fundraising established Villaraigosa as a viable candidate for mayor.

While Villaraigosa's campaign was not ultimately successful in the contest, the election highlighted new possibilities in political behavior. Registered Latinos voted at higher rates than non-Latinos and ethnicity appeared to have been a strong predictor of candidate choice. Exit polls from the *Los Angeles Times* following the election offer some initial evidence in support of this argument, as do precinct level results from the Los Angeles city clerk. Citywide, Latino turnout was the highest of any racial/ethnic group, and over 80% of Latinos voted for Villaraigosa.

Given that we expect the presence of a co-ethnic candidate to spur increased Latino participation (among registered voters), it should not be surprising that we expect to find further that Latinos will likely support Villaraigosa's candidacy more than that of Hahn's.

TABLE 1

Summary of Voting and Ethnicity in Los Angeles Mayoral Election

Ethnicity	% Share of Electorate	% Voter Turnout	% Villaraigosa	% Hahn
Latino	22	41	82	18
Black	17	39	20	80
Asian	6	35	35	65
White	52	36	41	59
Citywide	100	37.7	46.5	53.5

Source. Los Angeles Times Poll, 2001; Los Angeles City Clerk, 2001.

The two phenomena would seem to be inextricably linked together. Incredibly, despite the growth in the number of Latino candidates over the past three decades, few efforts have been made to understand the impact of co-ethnic candidates and voting preferences. Studies that have been completed suggest that ethnicity is not a determinant of vote choice. At most, ethnicity is thought to have an indirect influence of vote choice, by influencing partisanship (Graves & Lee, 2000). Even with respect to the 2001 election in Los Angeles, some scholars have stated that ideology not ethnicity was the more important variable in explaining patterns of Latino participation (Abrajano, Alvarez, & Nagler, 2003).

To the contrary, we argue that ethnicity should play a significant role and that Latinos will be more likely to support their co-ethnic candidate in the Los Angeles election. The logic surrounding this expectation echoes the earlier stated reasons for anticipating increases in voter turnout. Given the combination of a politicized shared group experience and the presence of a co-ethnic candidate, Latinos should not be expected to pass up an opportunity to elect that candidate. Because the mayoral election was non-partisan in nature and featured two Democratic candidates in the runoff, it is possible to sidestep the notion that the ethnicity effect is mediated by partisanship. If ethnicity only influenced partisanship, rather than directly influencing candidate preference, there would be no discernable difference between Latino votes for Hahn and Villaraigosa.

This article explores three conceptual questions, all oriented towards elections with top of the ticket co-ethnic candidates. While Latino candidates are present on the ballot in many elections in Los Angeles, our theoretical position is premised on the notion that candidates for key positions are more important to ethnic mobilization throughout the city. These key electoral positions are important because they garner more media attention, have higher name recognition, and represent an important role for minority communities as the executive office holder.

First, under which circumstances do Latinos vote at higher rates? Specifically, in an election with a top of the ticket Latino candidate, are Latinos more likely to turnout than when a co-ethnic candidate is not present? Second, are Latino rates of turnout higher than those of non-Latinos in elections with a Latino co-ethnic candidate? Third, are Latinos more likely to favor a co-ethnic candidate to the non-Latino alternative in these elections? To derive concrete answers to these questions, the following three hypotheses are tested:

(1) In an election with a co-ethnic candidate, high-percentage Latino precincts will have higher rates of voting compared to an election without a co-ethnic candidate.
(2) In an election with a co-ethnic candidate, high-percentage Latino precincts will have higher rates of voting compared to low-percentage Latino precincts.

(3) In an election with a co-ethnic candidate, as the percentage of Latinos in a precinct increases, so too will the vote share for the co-ethnic candidate.

We examine these questions by estimating whether or not high-percentage Latino precincts experience higher or lower voter turnout when a Latino candidate is running; whether turnout in these precincts is higher than in low-percentage Latino precincts; and by estimating whether or not heavily Latino precincts favor the co-ethnic candidate. We now turn to a discussion of the analytical approach, the data and its limitations, and a presentation of the estimates.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND DATA

The units of analysis are the individual precincts in the city of Los Angeles, California across two elections: the November 7, 2000 Presidential and the June 5, 2001 mayoral runoff. Data were collected from three main sources: (1) the Los Angeles County Registrar of Voter's database, (2) the Los Angeles City Clerk Statement of Votes Cast, and (3) the U.S. Census Bureau. In full the total number of observations stands at 1,730, which represents all complete precincts in the city. While recent surveys of Latino political attitudes exist (Kaiser Family Foundation, 1999; Pew Hispanic Center, 2002), they do not provide a sufficient mechanism to test our hypotheses. Both of the aforementioned surveys were conducted prior to national elections and there is no measure of validated voter turnout. In contests without Latino candidates present, survey respondents were asked to speculate on their candidate preference months before the actual election. Also, as is problematic with all self-reported studies of turnout and candidate preference, social desirability bias undercuts the reliability of those estimates. Our data report the official election results for both voter turnout and candidate vote share, offering a better means to test these hypotheses. Within this context, there are two important methodological notes that accompany this research.

The first of these concerns ecological problems of using aggregate level data. Because the unit of analysis is the precinct and not the individual voter, these findings must be interpreted at the level of the precinct or political jurisdiction not the individual voter. The ecological inference problem, first noted by Robinson (1950), stems from the attempt to infer individual level behavior from aggregate data. That is, if we find that high-density Latino precincts maintain a positive and significant relationship with voting, we cannot, with certainty, report that individual Latinos are voting at higher rates. Rather, we can only know that predominately Latino precincts demonstrate higher rates of overall turnout than sparsely Latino precincts. To correct for this shortcoming, Goodman (1955) and King (1997) both developed methods for dealing with ecological inference. However, neither provides the researcher with the ability to conduct a multivariate analysis of turnout or candidate preference. While these techniques have been used by the courts in evaluating claims of racial block voting alone, they may not suffice for social scientists interested in voting patterns, independent of partisanship, age, income, and education. For this reason, a multivariate regression analysis with aggregate level data is warranted. (To supplement the multivariate OLS analysis, we also conducted bivariate ecological inference analysis using the Goodman and King techniques. These results are consistent with the findings presented here and are available from the authors.)

Second, it is important to note that the basis for examining participation is among registered voters, not eligible voters. Thus, while the findings here may suggest that Latinos will participate at higher rates than non-Latinos in certain electoral

circumstances, this should only be read within the context of the registered voting population. Previous studies of Latino politics have noted the low rates of voting vis-à-vis the adult and adult, citizen population (DeSipio, 1996; Pachon, 1998, 1999; Sierra, Carrillo, DeSipio, & Jones-Correa, 2000). Recently, Ramírez (2002) demonstrated the effectiveness of registration and mobilization drives by Latino civic organizations, however, additional studies are necessary to determine what impact, if any, the presence of Latino candidates has on narrowing the registration gap between for Latinos.

Using the 2000 Presidential and 2001 Mayoral Elections as Points of Comparison

Assessing Latino voter turnout in the mayoral election is interesting by itself, indeed doing so is the primary focus of the article. However, a second base election is useful to provide a point of comparison for the Latino electorate and is necessary to test the first of our three hypotheses. Ideally, another city of Los Angeles mayoral election would be used, such as the 1997 contest between incumbent Mayor Richard Riordan and former state legislator Tom Hayden to compare how Latino voters fared in like electoral situations across time. Instead, we use the November 2000 presidential election results for a number of reasons.

First, the Latino vote was well targeted by both major party candidates during the 2000 presidential election. This targeting, coupled with the extensive outreach efforts of community organizations that conducted registration and mobilization drives, increased expectations that the Latino vote would be heightened relative to years past. According to party records, Republicans spent more than 2.3 million and Democrats more than 1 million on Spanish-language advertisements in 2000 (Dinan, 2003). Additionally, SVREP, NALEO, and the AFL-CIO all conducted their largest ever Latino mobilization drives in the Los Angeles area. The 1997 mayoral election, on the other hand, offered little in the way of mobilization efforts or issues of particular salience on the ballot. Riordan took the victory with relative ease, beating Hayden by a nearly two to one margin. Comparing the Hahn-Villaraigosa race with the 1997 mayoral contest would not constitute a methodologically effective comparison. By choosing an alternative election in which Latinos were targeted, the empirical threshold to confirm these expectations is raised.

A second reason for using the 2000 presidential election for comparison is that it occurred less than a year before the mayoral election and allows for a consistent electoral picture in terms of demographics and issue salience. The issues facing Los Angeles, the local political landscape, and the underlying demographic traits of the city electorate are far more comparable in this analysis than they would be by comparing two mayoral elections four years apart.

A third reason why the presidential election is suitable for this analysis is that it featured no Latino candidates at the top of the ticket: almost all of the attention was on George W. Bush and Al Gore. Admittedly, the 1997 mayoral contest had two white candidates. However, the remarkable lack of competition in that election precludes using it as a comparator for the 2001 contest. Moreover, Riordan was a popular incumbent and interest in the election was fairly low. In the 1997 Los Angeles mayoral election, Latinos accounted for just 14% of all voters, even as they were 16% of all registered voters. In addition, 60% of the Latino vote went for to Republican incumbent Mayor Richard Riordan with 33% going to challenger Tom Hayden. Indeed, in both elections examined, the level of competitiveness was high. The presidential election was touted as a

statistical dead heat days before the final vote, and the mayoral election was up in the air in the final week.

Plan of Analysis and Description of the Data

We offer several approaches in an effort to test these expectations from a variety of analytical positions. Though several estimates are presented, only two dependent variables are used: Voter Turnout and Voter Preference. In the first sequence of models, the dependent variable is Voter Turnout and is measured as the number of total votes cast divided by the total number of registered voters within the precinct. In the second set of models, Voter Preference is the number of votes cast for Villaraigosa divided by the total number of votes cast within each precinct. Both of these dependent variables are continuous, ranging theoretically from 0 to 100 and robust OLS techniques are used in each estimate.

We bring a variety of well-known measures to bear on the estimates of Voter Turnout and Voter Preference. The key predictor is *Percent Latino*. This is measured as the total number of Latinos registered to vote within each precinct divided by the total number of registered voters. Latinos are identified by way of the U.S. Census Spanish surname database, which contains over 25,000 Latino surnames and is considered 94% accurate (Word & Perkins, 1996). We expect that as the *Percent Latino* increases within a precinct, turnout and preference for the Latino candidate should be significantly and positively affected during the mayoral elections. This should be viewed in sharp contrast to the 2000 presidential election where the expectation is that the size of a precinct's Latino population is a less powerful predictor because of the absence of a Latino candidate.

A number of control variables are included as well. Racial and ethnic variables include *Percent Asian* (identified using a surname database) and *Percent Black* (identified via 2000 Census data at the census tract level) measured similarly to the *Percent Latino* variable. Additional demographic variables include *Percent Male, Percent GOP*, and *Percent Over 40*. Each of these measures is derived from the list of registered voters and is measured as the percentage within each respective precinct. Two additional demographic variables are taken from assembly level information–*Education* and *Income*. Education is a calculation of the proportion of individuals with at least a college degree, and Income measures the median household income in the assembly district.

A series of relevant political factors are included as controls as well. First, *Total Registration* is the number of potential voters in a precinct and serves as the denominator for all percentage-based measures. *Post 1998 Registration* accounts for the proportion of a precinct's population that registered after 1998 and is meant to capture the effect of relatively new voters. Because Antonio Villaraigosa's former state assembly seat (Assembly District 45) was located within Los Angeles, a dummy variable is included (measured one for precincts within his former Assembly District and zero otherwise) to control for popularity in his former district.

The results are presented according to the question asked, i.e., voter turnout or voter preference. We turn first to models of voter turnout estimated using OLS regression. Voter turnout is modeled across the two elections separately and in a pooled setup where both elections are combined with interaction variables added. We look second at the models of voter preference, estimated using the same convention of ordinary least squares analysis. For voter preference models, the focus is exclusively on the 2001 mayoral runoff election (in separate analyses we examined the 2001 primary and the results are consistent). We now turn now to these results.

THE FINDINGS

Voter Turnout: Election Specific Results

Table 2 contains the results for the presidential and mayoral elections estimated separately. For each election, OLS coefficients and standard errors are reported (column one) and each variable's associated beta estimate (column two). Looking first at the results for the 2000 presidential election, our expectations are generally confirmed in reference to the Latino vote in that contest. In terms of the specific variable of interest in the presidential OLS model, *Percent Latino* is negative, but insignificantly related to turnout. *Education, Male* and *Age* all carry positive and significant influences on turnout as does the dummy variable for Villaraigosa's Assembly District. Precincts with high levels of registered and newly registered citizens experienced lower rates of turnout. These results show that in the 2000 presidential election, increasing numbers of Latino registrants did not have a positive influence in raising precinct level turnout.

To this point, the findings are consistent with the voluminous research that suggests, even controlling for citizenship and registration, Latinos vote at lower rates than Anglos. But, turning to the results from the mayoral election, a markedly different pattern emerges

TABLE 2

Turnout in Presidential and Mayoral Elections

Independent Variables	Presidential Election		Mayoral Election	
	OLS Coef.	Beta Coef.	OLS Coef.	Beta Coef.
Total registration	−.0085***	−.1054***	−.0041***	−.0987***
	(.0017)		(.0008)	
Percentage Latino	−0.0087	−0.0116	.1643***	.4235***
	(.0203)		(.0097)	
Percentage Black	−0.0227	−0.0241	.0588***	.1209***
	(.0312)		(.0133)	
Percentage Asian	−0.0381	−0.0144	−0.0038	−0.0028
	(.0455)		(.0245)	
Percentage Male	.1786*	.0553*	0.0546	0.0327
	(.1039)		(.0385)	
Percentage GOP	0.0481	0.0338	−.0863***	−.1354***
	(.0393)		(.0166)	
Age	.0830*	.0490*	.1316***	.1508***
	(.0443)		(.0183)	
Post 1998 registration	−.4882***	−.3314***	−.5145***	−.6768***
	(.0372)		(.0169)	
Education	.4068***	.2643***	.1687***	.2124***
	(.0863)		(.0314)	
Income	−0.0001	−0.07	−.0001***	−.2042***
	(.0001)		(.0000)	
AD 45	4.522***	.0839***	3.617***	.1300***
	(1.103)		(.6622)	
Constant	67.816***		40.521***	
	(6.722)		(.3570)	
N	1,723		1,723	
F/Chi	59.42***		256.67***	
Adj R^2	0.2608		0.5864	

*p < .100. **p < .050. ***p < .001.

(Table 2). The variable *Percent Latino* is positive and significant, confirming our initial hypothesis. *AD45*, accounting for Villaraigosa's popularity within his former district, is positive and significant, as expected. Note that the inclusion of this control in the model does not diminish the robust result for *Percent Latino*.

These results contradict most research in this area, but complement other studies (Gilliam & Kaufmann, 1998; Kaufmann, 2003) which show, respectively, that black voter turnout in Los Angeles is higher than average when black candidates are present, and that Latinos in Denver voted at higher rates than non-Latinos when a Latino candidate is present (see also Hero, 1992). Similarly, studies in Miami have found support for ethnic voting among Cuban Americans (Hill, Moreno, & Cue 2001). It also lends support to the notion Garcia and Arce (1988) posited, that Latino turnout may be similar and sometimes higher than that of non-Latinos as a result of "situational factors such as local personalities and ethnically defined political races, local issues compelling to Chicanos, historical patterns, and sophisticated organizational activities" (p. 129).

Beyond the direction of the sign and the significance levels of individual coefficients, an explicit comparison within and between models by examining the standardized beta coefficients is possible. Comparing coefficients across models helps to further demonstrate that different electoral circumstances may lead to quite different results. Cross-model comparisons are often used to measure differences in institutions and political environments, most notably in Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978). Verba, Nie, and Kim employ a seven-nation comparison of political participation to determine why people participate in different countries. In describing their methods, the authors conclude that cross-model comparison is well suited for studies of voting turnout when the various models being compared contain similar measures and variables. If functional equivalence of the dependent variable is achieved, then comparing models is justified (Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978). In this research, the models presented contain the same independent variables and, in fact, both dependent variables are more than functionally equivalent, they are in fact identical. Thus, we can be confident in the differences found when comparing across the two elections. Both models are identical in reference to the measures employed on the right hand side of the Equation. In column two of the mayoral election results for example, the standardized beta coefficient of *Percent Latino* (.4235) is more than double the size of age, education, and income variables. Comparing the estimates, this result should be viewed relative to the negative sign and insignificant contribution of the *Percent Latino* measure in the presidential election. The proportion of Latinos among registered voters was clearly a more important factor for determining increases in turnout in the mayoral election than it was in the presidential contest.

While not as robust as the coefficient for *Percent Latino*, higher percentages of Black registrants also resulted in higher turnout. Although there were no African American candidates at the top of the ticket, Hahn had strong support from the Black community and the election was highly racialized and seen as a zero-sum competition between Latinos and Blacks (Los Angeles Times, 2001). This may have prompted heightened interest among Blacks and spurred higher levels of voter turnout, as compared to the presidential election. In the mayoral election, again relative to the presidential election, the proportion of Republican registrants was associated with less turnout, and *Income* shows a negative and significant effect. Both results indicate that the race between two Democrats was less compelling for members of the GOP and relatively higher income registrants.

Meanwhile, the unstandardized coefficients presented in the first column (again, of the mayoral results) allow for a determination of how a unit change in a given independent variable cause the dependent variable to move. A coefficient of .164 on *Percent Latino*

reveals that for approximately every six-percentage points a precinct's registered voters become more Latino, voter turnout should increase about 1% (6 * .164 = .984). Taken further, if 20% of the registrants in precinct A are Latino, and 80% of the registrants in precinct B are Latino, this 60 percentage point increase in Latinos should result in higher voter turnout in precinct B by 10 percentage points. Explicit examination of the under-lying data offers many examples of this estimate. Precinct 9000358 is 19% Latino and reported voter turnout of 35%. Precinct 9004120 is 79% Latino and reported turnout 10 percentage points higher at 45%. Stated simply, the model's results show that where more Latinos are registered to vote within a precinct, voter turnout will be relatively higher in the 2001 mayoral election where a Latino is present on the ballot.

The results reported thus far confirm that as the proportion of registered voters in a precinct that is Latino grows, that precinct's rate of turnout will increase in the 2001 mayoral election and diminish in the 2000 presidential contest. Higher density Latino precincts vote at higher rates when a viable Latino candidate is present. These results also show that when a Latino candidate is on the ballot, high-density Latino precincts register higher rates of turnout than do precincts comprised largely of whites, Blacks, Asians, and other racial and ethnic groups.

Voter Turnout–Pooled Election Results

In order to buttress the analysis of the two comparison elections in a side-by-side model framework, a pooled version of the model is also estimated with the data from both elections contained within the same equation. To specify the anticipated effect some additional variables are included. First, *Co-ethnic* measures the presence of a Latino candidate at the top of the ticket for the June 2001 election as a dichotomous (0, 1) variable. We expect this variable to exhibit a negative and significant result because in exclusion of the other measures it merely accounts for the lower voter turnout associated with local elections relative to national elections. An interaction variable, *Latino* *Co-ethnic*, is created by multiplying the *Percent Latino* variable by the *Co-ethnic* dummy variable. This interaction variable specifically measures the influence of a co-ethnic candidate on Latino participation. Because the mayoral election is non-partisan, *Percent GOP* and *Co-ethnic* are interacted and included in the pooled model as well. While the split sample regressions employed above allow for a comparison of the impact of each independent variable in the two separate elections, by pooling the sample and including the interaction variables it is possible to confirm whether or not the differences in coefficients witnessed in the split sample analysis are directly attributable to the presence of a co-ethnic candidate.

In the pooled analysis each precinct is represented twice (once for each election), which doubles the sample size from 1,723 to 3,446. The dependent variable, *Voter Turnout*, is joined into one column with each row representing the turnout rate for the presidential or the mayoral election for a given precinct. The results of the pooled sample regression are displayed in Table 3.

With both elections included in the model, the standard predictors of voter turnout are again instrumental in the model. Measures for age, education, and partisanship are all positive and significant predictors of voter turnout. Interestingly, again, income has a negative effect, although its impact is very limited. Other significant variables include *Percent Male*, which is positive and *Post 1998 Registration*, which is negative, suggesting that higher percentages of males translates into more turnout while precincts with large newly registered populations show lower levels of turnout.

TABLE 3

Voter Turnout: Pooled Election Model

Independent Variables	OLS Coef.	Beta Coef.
Total registration	−.0063***	−.0566***
	(.0010)	
Co-ethnic	−30.769***	−.7824***
	(.7546)	
Latino*co-ethnic	.2179***	.1870***
	(.0152)	
Percent Latino	−.0311**	−.0300**
	(.0158)	
Percent Black	0.018	0.0139
	(.0169)	
Percent Asian	−0.0209	−0.0057
	(.0259)	
Percent Male	.1166**	.0261**
	(.0556)	
Percent GOP	.1154***	.0677***
	(.0326)	
GOP*co-ethnic	−.2692***	−.1858***
	(.0313)	
Age	.1073***	.0459***
	(.0239)	
Post 1998 registration	−.5013***	−.2466***
	(.0205)	
Education	.2877***	.1354***
	(.0462)	
Income	−.0001**	−.0635**
	(.0000)	
AD 45	4.070***	.0547***
	(.6436)	
Constant	69.553***	
	(3.594)	
N	3,446	
F/Chi	946.33***	
Adj. R^2	0.7711	

*$p < .1$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < .001$.

For measures of partisanship, the interactive variable behaves as expected. Alone, more Republicans (*Percent GOP*) means more turnout, but when interacted with the non-partisan mayoral election variable, larger numbers of Republicans in a precinct translates to lower aggregate turnout rates. For a more accurate estimate of Republican participation, the effects of *Percent GOP* need to be combined with the interaction term for an overall effect of participation in the non-partisan election. Adding the coefficient for *Percent GOP* (.1154) to the coefficient for *GOP*Co-ethnic* election (−.2692) yields an overall negative effect of −.1538. With two Democrats as the only candidates in the mayoral runoff election this decline in Republican voting is expected and supports the pattern evidenced in the election specific models presented above.

Turning to the variables of central interest, *Percent Latino* is negative and significant, and as expected, *Co-ethnic* is negative and significant. However, the interaction variable *Latino*Co-ethnic* is positive and significant. The explanation is that by itself, percent

Latino within a precinct has a limiting effect on the turnout rate of the precinct. Also, local elections for mayor (captured implicitly by the *Co-ethnic* variable) result in lower turnout than national elections for President. Key to our expectations, in the mayoral election with a Latino candidate, percent Latino within a precinct propels the precinct to higher rates of turnout. Further, combining the coefficients of *Percent Latino* (−.0311) and *Latino*Co-ethnic* (.2179) results in a positive interaction coefficient value (.1868), which suggests that for Latinos the election offering a co-ethnic candidates ultimately offered a significantly positive inducement for turnout.

It is especially important that the additive effect of the two coefficients is positive. For example, had the coefficient for percent Latino been −.20 and the coefficient for the interaction variable been .10, one could conclude that the presence of a co-ethnic candidate does improve Latino turnout. But as compared to other groups, highly Latino precincts still voted at lower rates (e.g., −.20 + .10 = −.10). However, here the effect of a co-ethnic candidate is quite robust and more than accounts for the negative influence on turnout of percent Latino. Thus, we can conclude that heavily Latino precincts are not only more likely to vote when a co-ethnic candidate is running than they would otherwise, but also that heavily Latino precincts are actually turning out at higher rates than precincts with larger proportions of non-Latinos.

More specifically, the combined unstandardized coefficient of approximately 0.18 implies that as a precinct's registered Latino population increases by 5.5 percentage points, its voter turnout should be roughly one point higher (0.18 * 5.5 = 0.99). Put another way, if one precinct is 20% Latino and another 75% Latino, this increase of 55 points (or units) in the independent variable should result in the dependent variable (*Voter Turnout*) being more than 10 percentage points higher when a co-ethnic candidate is present.

Candidate Preference in the Mayoral Election

Having confirmed the first and second hypotheses regarding the voter turnout of Latinos in the 2001 mayoral election relative (H1) to Latinos in the 2000 presidential election and (H2) to all other voters, we turn next to an examination of the third hypothesis. Here, the aim is to explain candidate preference between a Latino mayoral candidate and a white, non-Latino mayoral candidate. Recall that extant research on this issue suggests that ethnicity is not a determinant of vote choice and that the issue of partisanship is so strong a predictor that ethnicity has no direct effect. At most, ethnicity is thought to have an indirect influence on vote choice by influencing partisanship (Graves & Lee, 2000). In contrast, the data presented here (see Table 4) suggest that ethnicity does in fact have a direct effect on vote choice beyond that of partisanship. Although individual level inference is not possible, precincts with higher percentages of Latinos greatly favored the Latino candidate over the White, non-Latino candidate. This finding, consistent with Kaufmann's (2003) analysis of Denver mayoral elections, supports the empowerment hypothesis suggesting, "in-group identification is a powerful electoral cue" (p. 17).

As indicated in Table 4, Villaraigosa's share of the precinct level vote is clearly a function of the percentage Latino within a precinct. Comparing the standardized beta coefficients in the model, *Percent Latino* has the largest influence on the vote share for the Latino candidate. The unstandardized coefficient translates to a 6.4 percentage point margin in favor of Villaraigosa for every 10 percentages a precinct increases in registered Latinos. Thus, if the Latino candidate received 30% of the vote in a precinct that was 10% Latino, we might expect him to receive 74% of the vote in a precinct that was 80% Latino

TABLE 4

Candidate Preference 2001 Los Angeles Mayoral Election

Independent Variables	OLS Coef.	Beta Coef.
Total registration	−.0009	−.0092
	(.0013)	
Percent Latino	.6357***	.7015***
	(.0154)	
Percent Black	−.1322***	−.1165***
	(.0265)	
Percent Asian	.0698	.0219
	(.0596)	
Percent Male	.8384***	.2156***
	(.0987)	
Percent GOP	−.2564***	−.1724***
	(.0339)	
Age	−.2227***	−.1093***
	(.0360)	
Post 1998 Registration	.3454***	.1948***
	(.0313)	
College	.2839***	.1531***
	(.0590)	
Income	.0001***	.1306***
	(.0000)	
AD 45	5.245***	.0805***
	(.8464)	
Constant	−9.337	—
	(5.822)	
N	1,722	
F/Chi	677.02***	
Adj. R^2	.7681	

*$p < .1$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < .001$.

(70 point increase * $.635 = 44$ and $30\% + 44\% = 72\%$). The empirical results bear this out with Villaraigosa winning over 70% of the vote in nearly all precincts over 80% Latino.

As noted in Table 4, the model controls for the partisanship of the precinct, but recall that in the non-partisan mayoral election, both candidates in the runoff have considerable allegiance to (and are registered with) the Democratic Party. Because the two candidates were both Democrats, it is possible that Latinos were free to vote for the Latino candidate and that the same situation would not hold were a Republican candidate present. However, if partisanship were the driving force, we would still expect Latino voters to evaluate both Democratic candidates with respect to the issues and policies at play, resulting in a more equal split between the two. Numerous surveys over several years of Latino registered voters have found strong ties to the Democratic Party, but a split in ideological tendencies with roughly equal thirds identifying as liberal, moderate and conservative (see for example Kaiser, 1999; LNPS, 1989; TRPI, 1996, 2000). Thus, we might expect conservative Latinos to select the more conservative Democrat, Hahn; liberal Latinos to select the more liberal Democrat, Villaraigosa; and moderate Latinos to split their vote between the two Democrats, resulting in something closer to a 50–50 split between Villaraigosa and Hahn. Because of the overwhelming support for Villaraigosa in high percentage Latino precincts, ethnicity should be considered as a primary determinant of vote choice when a

co-ethnic candidate is present. (Even in the primary election when a strong Republican candidate was present, Steven Soboroff, the results reflect that ethnicity predicted strong support for Villaraigosa over Hahn or other Democrats in the race among Latinos).

Several other notable patterns of candidate preference emerge. As the number of African Americans increase within a precinct so too does the proportion of that precinct's votes for Hahn. This is in no small part due to strong ties between Hahn's father, former County Supervisor Kenneth Hahn, and the black community. In addition, James Hahn had endorsed the re-appointment of black police chief Bernard Parks, a move supported by many black leaders. While other research on minority voting behavior suggests that blacks do support the Latino candidate in mayoral elections (although at lower levels than Latinos do), this finding confirms that in this specific race in Los Angeles, a significant divide existed between Latino and black candidate preference (although in the city attorney contest, a majority of Blacks and a majority of Latinos supported Latino candidate Rocky Delgadillo). Interestingly, *Percent Asian* is not significant despite some suggestion that Villaraigosa may have done poorly in the Asian community. In addition, increases in the percentage male in a precinct meant statistically more support for Villaraigosa, while Hahn did considerably better as the percentage Republican and the percentage of older voters increased in a precinct. The percentage of newly registered voters also translated to more support for Villaraigosa as did the percentage of registrants with a college degree and with higher levels of income.

CONCLUSION

In this article, we have found that under certain circumstances Latinos will turnout to vote at heightened rates, and at rates greater than those of other ethnic and racial groups, including whites. Driving this effort is the notion that ethnicity may directly influence candidate preference, causing Latinos to vote for a co-ethnic candidate when one is present on the ballot. In general, this analysis shows that each of our three expectations is confirmed in the 2001 Los Angeles mayoral election. Precincts with larger proportions of Latino registrants evidenced higher rates of turnout in the election that offered a co-ethnic candidate than they did in the election that did not. In the election that offered a co-ethnic candidate higher percentage Latino precincts turned out at higher rates than did low percentage Latino precincts. Finally, these same high percentage precincts were also more likely to support Villaraigosa, the Latino candidate.

To some degree, this analysis is open to the critique that our findings are limited to the extent that the factors present in Los Angeles (including a legacy of three perceptibly anti-Latino California propositions and the governorship of Pete Wilson) may not be present in other areas throughout the nation or at other points in time. While the data and specific empirical analyses offered are limited to Los Angeles, we think the implications derived from this effort will reach well beyond the limits of the city.

First, unlike the Garcia and Arce (1988) quote that originally framed this article or the voluminous array of research cited at the onset of this article, this research shows that under some circumstances Latinos will turnout to vote. Second, this research calls into question the finding that race and ethnicity may no longer be important determinants of candidate preference (see Graves & Lee, 2000) or minority political participation generally (see Parenti, 1967). Specifically, we demonstrate that voter preference may be directly influenced by ethnicity. This confirms anew a prevailing theme borrowed from the empowerment literature (Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Gilliam & Kaufman, 1998; Reeves,

1997; Tate, 1993)–that the presence of co-ethnic candidates will influence minority electoral participation.

In particular, we have demonstrated that Latino voter turnout is not necessarily doomed to perennially low levels as so much of the research over the last 40 years suggests. In most elections examined in previous research, no viable Latino candidates were present at the top of the ticket and Latino voters may not have felt in touch with the predominantly Anglo candidates running for office. The 2001 Los Angeles mayoral election provides the context to test this scenario for Latino voter turnout. In fact, this research has found that while heavily Latino precincts are less likely to have high levels of turnout in the 2000 presidential election, they are the most likely to have high turnout levels in the 2001 mayoral election. However, in the end the Latino candidate lost the election. While the aim of this article is not to explain the ingredients of a successful campaign, it is important to reflect on the outcome of the election. While Villaraigosa received considerable support from Latino voters, he did relatively poorly among African Americans, receiving only about 20% of the Black vote. In other cities such as Denver, Black and Latino voters formed a coalition to help elect both Latino and Black mayors. According to Sonenshein and Pinkus (2002), the failure to reconstitute the Tom Bradley coalition in Los Angeles may have cost Villaraigosa the election in 2001. Despite losing the election, the Villaraigosa candidacy demonstrated Latinos will vote at high rates and that ethnicity can be a mobilizing factor.

Further, an increasing array of cities across the country may offer the next locales in which our hypotheses might be tested. The 2000 Census has revealed that minority populations are growing throughout the United States and many large urban centers have (or will soon have) a majority minority population. Future mayoral elections, as well as statewide elections that feature co-ethnic candidates, should be expected to mobilize the Latino electorate in a manner similar to that which we chronicled here and may well lead to increased levels of voter turnout. The 2001 mayoral election cycle demonstrated that in three cities that are each distinct politically and demographically from Los Angeles, Latino voters supported Latino candidates overwhelmingly (see Table 5).

In Houston, the Cuban-born candidate Orlando Sanchez, a registered Republican, received over 70% of the Latino vote from the predominantly Mexican American community with ties to the Democratic Party. In Miami, second generation Cuban American Manny Diaz emphasized his strong ties to the Cuban community and won over 70% of the Latino vote despite being a registered Democrat in a community where most Latino voters are Republican. In New York City, Puerto Rican candidate Freddy Ferrer garnered over 80% of the diverse Latino vote bringing together Puerto Rican, Dominican, Colombian, and Mexican American segments of the Latino community in New York in the Democratic primary.

TABLE 5

Latino Candidate Preference Nationwide in 2001 Mayoral Elections

City:	Los Angeles	Houston	New York	Miami
Candidate:	Villaraigosa	Sanchez	Ferrer	Diaz
% Latino vote:	82%	72%	84%	70%

Source. Corral, 2001; *Los Angeles Times* Poll, 2001; Nagourney, 2001; Williams, 2001.

While these examples are primarily anecdotal, they offer further contextual support for our general argument and the analysis specific to our third hypothesis. These examples also highlight further avenues of research. We have shown a direct connection between the high percentage Latino precincts levels of turnout and the presence of a Latino candidate at the top of the ballot. We also show that high-density Latino precincts actually post higher rates of voting than do low-density Latino precincts when a co-ethnic candidate is present. Finally, underscoring the summary statistics shown in Table 5, we have demonstrated that high percentage Latino precincts are far more likely to support Latino candidates. In full, these results provide evidence anew on the importance of understanding the role of ethnicity in political participation.

REFERENCES

Abrajano, M., Alvarez, M., & Nagler, J. (2003). *Race-based versus issue voting: A natural experiment*. Paper presented at the Midwestern Political Science Association conference, Chicago, IL.

Affigne, T. (2000). Latino politics in the United States: An introduction. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, *33*(3), 523–527.

Arteaga, L. (2000). Are Latinos pro-democrat or anti-republican? An examination of party registration and allegiance in the 2000 election and beyond. *The California Latino Vote 2000*. San Francisco: Latino Issues Forum.

Arvizu, J. R., & Garcia, F. C. (1996). Latino voting participation: Explaining and differentiating Latino voting turnout. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, *18*(104), 28.

Bobo, L., & Gilliam, F. D. (1990). Race, sociopolitical participation, and black empowerment. *American Political Science Review*, *84*, 377–394.

Browning, R. P., Marshall, D. R., & Tabb, D. H. (1984). *Protest is not enough*. Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bullock, C. S. III. (1984). Racial crossover voting and the election of black officials. *Journal of Politics*, *46*, 238–51.

Calvo, M. A., & Rosenstone, S. J. (1989). *Hispanic political participation*. San Antonio: Southwest Voter Research Institute.

Corral, O. (2001, November 15). Diaz launches mayoralty reaching out. *The Miami Herald*.

Dahl, R. (1961). *Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

DeSipio, L. (1996). *Counting on the Latino vote: Latinos as a new electorate*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

de la Garza, R. O., Menchaca, M., & DeSipio, L. (Eds.). (1994). *Barrio ballots: Latino politics in the 1990 elections*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Diaz, W. (1996). Latino participation in America: Associational and political roles. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, *18*(2), 154–175.

Dinan, S. (2003, February 10). Hispanic outreach seen key to presidency. *Washington Times*, p. A4.

Garcia, J. A., & Arce, C. H. (1988). Political orientations and behaviors of Chicanos: Trying to make sense out of attitudes and participation. In F. C. Garcia (Ed.), *Pursuing power: Latinos and the political system* (pp. 125–151). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Garcia, J. A., Garcia, F. C., de la Garza, R., & Falcon, A. (1991). *Ethnicity and national origin status: Patterns of identities among Latinos in the US*. Paper presented at the 2001 American Political Science Association annual conference, Washington, DC.

Gilliam, F. D. (1996). Exploring minority empowerment: Symbolic politics, governing coalitions and traces of political style in Los Angeles. *American Journal of Political Science*, 40, 56–81.

Gilliam, F. D., & Kaufmann, K. M. (1998). Is there an empowerment life cycle? Long-term lack empowerment and its influence on voter participation. *Urban Affairs Review*, 33(6), 741–766.

Graves, S., & Lee, J. (2000). Ethnic underpinnings of voting preference: Latinos and the 1996 U.S. senate election Texas. *Social Science Quarterly*, 81, 227–236.

Hero, R. (1992). *Latinos and the U.S. political system: Two-tiered pluralism*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Hero, R., & Campbell, A. (1996). Understanding Latino political participation: Exploring the evidence from the Latino national political survey. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, 18(2), 129–141.

Hero, R. F., Garcia, C., Garcia, J., & Pachon, J. (2000). Latino participation, partisanship and office holding. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 33(3), 529–534.

Hill, K., Moreno, D., & Cue, L. (2001). Racial and partisan voting in a tri-ethnic city: The 1996 Dade County mayoral election. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 23, 291–307.

Hritzuk, N., & Park, D. K. (2000). The question of Latino political participation: From SES to a social structural explanation. *Social Science Quarterly*, 81, 151–165.

Kaufmann, K. (2003). Black and Latino voters in Denver: Responses to each other's political leadership. *Political Science Quarterly, Spring*, 107–126.

Keen, J., & Benedetto, R. (2001, August 5). Republican party on a crusade to win over Hispanic Americans. *USA Today*.

Key, V. O. (1949). *Southern politics in state and nation*. New York: Vintage.

Lester, W. (2001, December 7). The dynamic of ethnic loyalty. *The Associated Press*. Reprinted in The Puerto Rico Herald.

Leighley, J. E. (2001). *Strength in numbers? The political mobilization of racial and ethnic minorities*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lieske, J., & Hillard, J. W. (1984). The racial factor in urban elections. *Western Political Quarterly*, 37, 545–563.

Los Angeles Times Poll. (2001, June 6). Study #460: Exit poll Los Angeles city general election June 5, 2001. *Los Angeles Times*.

Los Angeles City Clerk (2001). General municipal & consolidated elections: Official election results, June 5, 2001. Available: http://161.149.221.240/clk/elections/ND4572.pdf [August 2004].

Marquez, B., & Jennings, J. (2000). Representation by other means: Mexican American and Puerto Rican social movement organizations. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 33(3), 541–546

Miller, A., Gurin, P., Gurin, G., & Malanchuk, O. (1981). Group consciousness and political participation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 25, 494–511.

Montoya, L. J, Hardy-Fanta, C., & Garcia, S. (2000). Latina politics: Gender, participation, and leadership. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 33(3), 555–561.

Myrdal, G. (1944). *An American dilemma: The Negro problem and modern democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.

NALEO. (2001). *The 2001 directory of Latino elected officials, 2001*. Los Angeles, CA: National Association of Latino Elected Officials.

Nagourney, A. (2001, October 12). The New York runoff: The Democrats; Green beats Ferrer in Democratic mayoral runoff." *The New York Times*.

Olsen, M. (1970). *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pachon, H. (1998). Latino politics in the golden state: Ready for the 21st century? In B. O. Jackson & M. B. Preston (Eds.), *Racial and ethnic politics in California* (pp. 411–438). Berkeley: Institute for Governmental Studies, University of California.

Pachon, H. (1999). California Latino politics and the 1996 elections: From potential to reality. In R. O. de la Garza & L. DeSipio (Eds.), *Awash in the mainstream* (pp. 172–192). Boulder: Westview Press.

Pantoja, A. D., Ramirez, R., & Segura, G. M. (2001). Citizens by choice, voters by necessity: Patterns in political mobilization by naturalized Latinos. *Political Research Quarterly*. *54*(4), 729–750.

Parenti, M. (1967). Ethnic politics and the persistence of ethnic identification. *American Political Science Review*, *61*, 717–26.

Ramirez, R. (2002). *Getting out the vote: The impact of non-partisan voter mobilization efforts in low turnout Latino precincts*. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association conference, Boston, MA.

Reeves, K. (1997). *Voting hopes or fears? White voters, black candidates and racial politics in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological correlations and individual behavior. *American Sociological Review*, *15*(195), 351–57.

Shaw, D., de la Garza, R. O., Lee, J. (2000). Examining Latino turnout in 1996: A three-state, validated survey approach (California, Florida, Texas). *American Journal of Political Science*, *44*(2), 338–346.

Sierra, C. M., Carrillo, T., DeSipio, L., & Jones-Correa, M. (2000). Latino immigration and citizenship. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, *33*(3), 535–540.

TRPI. (1996, November). *Statewide survey of Latino registered voters*. Claremont, CA: Tomás Rivera Policy Institute.

Tate, K. (1993). *From protest to politics: The new black voters in American elections*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Uhlaner, C. J., Cain, B., & Kiewiet, D. R. (1989). Political participation of ethnic minorities in the 1980s. *Political Behavior*, *11*(September), 195–231.

Uhlaner, C. (1989). Relational goods and participation: Incorporating sociability into a theory of rational action. *Public Choice*.

Verba, S., & Nie, N. H. (1972). *Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality*. New York, Harper & Row.

Verba, S., Nie, N. H., & Kim, J. (1978). *Participation and political equality: A seven-nation comparison*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic volunteerism in American politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Williams, J. (2001, December 2). 2001 the race for city hall/Brown wins nail-biter/Sanchez challenge falls short. *The Houston Chronicle*.

Wolfinger, R. E., & Rosenstone, S. J. (1980). *Who votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Word, D. & Perkins, C. (1996). *Building a Spanish surname list for the 1990's–A new approach to an old problem*. Technical Working Paper No. 13. Washington: US Bureau of the Census.